Healthcare.gov and the Gulf Between Planning and Reality

Back in the mid-1990s, I did a lot of web work for traditional media. That often meant figuring out what the client was already doing on the web, and how it was going, so I’d find the techies in the company, and ask them what they were doing, and how it was going. Then I’d tell management what I’d learned. This always struck me as a waste of my time and their money; I was like an overpaid bike messenger, moving information from one part of the firm to another. I didn’t understand the job I was doing until one meeting at a magazine company. 

The thing that made this meeting unusual was that one of their programmers had been invited to attend, so management could outline their web strategy to him. After the executives thanked me for explaining what I’d learned from log files given me by their own employees just days before, the programmer leaned forward and said “You know, we have all that information downstairs, but nobody’s ever asked us for it.”

I remember thinking “Oh, finally!” I figured the executives would be relieved this information was in-house, delighted that their own people were on it, maybe even mad at me for charging an exorbitant markup on local knowledge. Then I saw the look on their faces as they considered the programmer’s offer. The look wasn’t delight, or even relief, but contempt. The situation suddenly came clear: I was getting paid to save management from the distasteful act of listening to their own employees. 

In the early days of print, you had to understand the tech to run the organization. (Ben Franklin, the man who made America a media hothouse, called himself Printer.) But in the 19th century, the printing press became domesticated. Printers were no longer senior figures — they became blue-collar workers. And the executive suite no longer interacted with them much, except during contract negotiations.

This might have been nothing more than a previously hard job becoming easier, Hallelujah. But most print companies took it further. Talking to the people who understood the technology became demeaning, something to be avoided. Information was to move from management to workers, not vice-versa (a pattern that later came to other kinds of media businesses as well.) By the time the web came around and understanding the technology mattered again, many media executives hadn’t just lost the habit of talking with their own technically adept employees, they’d actively suppressed it.

I’d long forgotten about that meeting and those looks of contempt (I stopped building websites before most people started) until the launch of Healthcare.gov.

* * *

For the first couple of weeks after the launch, I assumed any difficulties in the Federal insurance market were caused by unexpected early interest, and that once the initial crush ebbed, all would be well. The sinking feeling that all would not be well started with this disillusioning paragraph about what had happened when a staff member at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the department responsible for Healthcare.gov, warned about difficulties with the site back in March. In response, his superiors told him…

[…] in effect, that failure was not an option, according to people who have spoken with him. Nor was rolling out the system in stages or on a smaller scale, as companies like Google typically do so that problems can more easily and quietly be fixed. Former government officials say the White House, which was calling the shots, feared that any backtracking would further embolden Republican critics who were trying to repeal the health care law.

The idea that “failure is not an option” is a fantasy version of how non-engineers should motivate engineers. That sentiment was invented by a screenwriter, riffing on an after-the-fact observation about Apollo 13; no one said it at the time. (If you ever say it, wash your mouth out with soap. If anyone ever says it to you, run.) Even NASA’s vaunted moonshot, so often referred to as the best of government innovation, tested with dozens of unmanned missions first, several of which failed outright.

Failure is always an option. Engineers work as hard as they do because they understand the risk of failure. And for anything it might have meant in its screenplay version, here that sentiment means the opposite; the unnamed executives were saying “Addressing the possibility of failure is not an option.”

* * *

The management question, when trying anything new, is “When does reality trump planning?” For the officials overseeing Healthcare.gov, the preferred answer was “Never.” Every time there was a chance to create some sort of public experimentation, or even just some clarity about its methods and goals, the imperative was to avoid giving the opposition anything to criticize.

At the time, this probably seemed like a way of avoiding early failures. But the project’s managers weren’t avoiding those failures. They were saving them up. The actual site is worse—far worse—for not having early and aggressive testing. Even accepting the crassest possible political rationale for denying opponents a target, avoiding all public review before launch has given those opponents more to complain about than any amount of ongoing trial and error would have. 

In his most recent press conference about the problems with the site, the President ruefully compared his campaigns’ use of technology with Healthcare.gov:

And I think it’s fair to say that we have a pretty good track record of working with folks on technology and IT from our campaign, where, both in 2008 and 2012, we did a pretty darn good job on that. […] If you’re doing it at the federal government level, you know, you’re going through, you know, 40 pages of specs and this and that and the other and there’s all kinds of law involved. And it makes it more difficult — it’s part of the reason why chronically federal IT programs are over budget, behind schedule.

It’s certainly true that Federal IT is chronically challenged by its own processes. But the biggest problem with Healthcare.gov was not timeline or budget. The biggest problem was that the site did not work, and the administration decided to launch it anyway. 

This is not just a hiring problem, or a procurement problem. This is a management problem, and a cultural problem. The preferred method for implementing large technology projects in Washington is to write the plans up front, break them into increasingly detailed specifications, then build what the specifications call for. It’s often called the waterfall method, because on a timeline the project cascades from planning, at the top left of the chart, down to implementation, on the bottom right.

Like all organizational models, waterfall is mainly a theory of collaboration. By putting the most serious planning at the beginning, with subsequent work derived from the plan, the waterfall method amounts to a pledge by all parties not to learn anything while doing the actual work. Instead, waterfall insists that the participants will understand best how things should work before accumulating any real-world experience, and that planners will always know more than workers.

This is a perfect fit for a culture that communicates in the deontic language of legislation. It is also a dreadful way to make new technology. If there is no room for learning by doing, early mistakes will resist correction. If the people with real technical knowledge can’t deliver bad news up the chain, potential failures get embedded rather than uprooted as the work goes on.

At the same press conference, the President also noted the degree to which he had been kept in the dark:

OK. On the website, I was not informed directly that the website would not be working the way it was supposed to. Had I been informed, I wouldn’t be going out saying “Boy, this is going to be great.” You know, I’m accused of a lot of things, but I don’t think I’m stupid enough to go around saying, this is going to be like shopping on Amazon or Travelocity, a week before the website opens, if I thought that it wasn’t going to work.

Healthcare.gov is a half-billion dollar site that was unable to complete even a thousand enrollments a day at launch, and for weeks afterwards. As we now know, programmers, stakeholders, and testers all expressed reservations about Healthcare.gov’s ability to do what it was supposed to do. Yet no one who understood the problems was able to tell the President. Worse, every senior political figure—every one—who could have bridged the gap between knowledgeable employees and the President decided not to. 

And so it was that, even on launch day, the President was allowed to make things worse for himself and his signature program by bragging about the already-failing site and inviting people to log in and use something that mostly wouldn’t work. Whatever happens to government procurement or hiring (and we should all hope those things get better) a culture that prefers deluding the boss over delivering bad news isn’t well equipped to try new things.

* * *

With a site this complex, things were never going to work perfectly the first day, whatever management thought they were procuring. Yet none of the engineers with a grasp of this particular reality could successfully convince the political appointees to adopt the obvious response: “Since the site won’t work for everyone anyway, let’s decide what tests to run on the initial uses we can support, and use what we learn to improve.” 

In this context, testing does not just mean “Checking to see what works and what doesn’t.” Even the Healthcare.gov team did some testing; it was late and desultory, but at least it was there. (The testers recommended delaying launch until the problems were fixed. This did not happen.) Testing means seeing what works and what doesn’t, and acting on that knowledge, even if that means contradicting management’s deeply held assumptions or goals. In well run organizations, information runs from the top down and from the bottom up.

One of the great descriptions of what real testing looks like comes from Valve software, in a piece detailing the making of its game Half-Life. After designing a game that was only sort of good, the team at Valve revamped its process, including constant testing: 

This [testing] was also a sure way to settle any design arguments. It became obvious that any personal opinion you had given really didn’t mean anything, at least not until the next test. Just because you were sure something was going to be fun didn’t make it so; the testers could still show up and demonstrate just how wrong you really were.

“Any personal opinion you had given really didn’t mean anything.” So it is in the government; any insistence that something must work is worthless if it actually doesn’t. 

An effective test is an exercise in humility; it’s only useful in a culture where desirability is not confused with likelihood. For a test to change things, everyone has to understand that their opinion, and their boss’s opinion, matters less than what actually works and what doesn’t. (An organization that isn’t learning from its users has decided it doesn’t want to learn from its users.)

Given comparisons with technological success from private organizations, a common response is that the government has special constraints, and thus cannot develop projects piecemeal, test with citizens, or learn from its mistakes in public. I was up at the Kennedy School a month after the launch, talking about technical leadership and Healthcare.gov, when one of the audience members made just this point, proposing that the difficult launch was unavoidable, because the government simply couldn’t have tested bits of the project over time.

That observation illustrates the gulf between planning and reality in political circles. It is hard for policy people to imagine that Healthcare.gov could have had a phased rollout, even while it is having one

At launch, on October 1, only a tiny fraction of potential users could actually try the service. They generated concrete errors. Those errors were handed to a team whose job was to improve the site, already public but only partially working. The resulting improvements are incremental, and put in place over a period of months. That is a phased rollout, just one conducted in the worst possible way. 

The vision of “technology” as something you can buy according to a plan, then have delivered as if it were coming off a truck, flatters and relieves managers who have no idea and no interest in how this stuff works, but it’s also a breeding ground for disaster. The mismatch between technical competence and executive authority is at least as bad in government now as it was in media companies in the 1990s, but with much more at stake.

* * *

Tom Steinberg, in his remembrance of his brilliant colleague Chris Lightfoot, said this about Lightfoot’s view of government and technology:

[W]hat he fundamentally had right was the understanding that you could no longer run a country properly if the elites don’t understand technology in the same way they grasp economics or ideology or propaganda. His analysis and predictions about what would happens if elites couldn’t learn were savage and depressingly accurate.

Now, and from now on, government will interact with its citizens via the internet, in increasingly important ways. This is a non-partisan issue; whichever party is in the White House will build and launch new forms of public service online. Unfortunately for us, our senior political figures have little habit of talking to their own technically adept employees.

If I had to design a litmus test for whether our political class grasps the internet, I would look for just one signal: Can anyone with authority over a new project articulate the tradeoff between features, quality, and time?

When a project cannot meet all three goals—a situation Healthcare.gov was clearly in by March—something will give. If you want certain features at a certain level of quality, you’d better be able to move the deadline. If you want overall quality by a certain deadline, you’d better be able to simplify, delay, or drop features. And if you have a fixed feature list and deadline, quality will suffer. 

Intoning “Failure is not an option” will be at best useless, and at worst harmful. There is no “Suddenly Go Faster” button, no way you can throw in money or additional developers as a late-stage accelerant; money is not directly tradable for either quality or speed, and adding more programmers to a late project makes it later. You can slip deadlines, reduce features, or, as a last resort, just launch and see what breaks. 

Denying this tradeoff doesn’t prevent it from happening. If no one with authority over the project understands that, the tradeoff is likely to mean sacrificing quality by default. That just happened to this administration’s signature policy goal. It will happen again, as long politicians can be allowed to imagine that if you just plan hard enough, you can ignore reality. It will happen again, as long as department heads imagine that complex technology can be procured like pencils. It will happen again as long as management regards listening to the people who understand the technology as a distasteful act.

Napster, Udacity, and the Academy

Fifteen years ago, a research group called The Fraunhofer Institute announced a new digital format for compressing movie files. This wasn’t a terribly momentous invention, but it did have one interesting side effect: Fraunhofer also had to figure out how to compress the soundtrack. The result was the Motion Picture Experts Group Format 1, Audio Layer III, a format you know and love, though only by its acronym, MP3.

The recording industry concluded this new audio format would be no threat, because quality mattered most. Who would listen to an MP3 when they could buy a better-sounding CD at the record store? Then Napster launched, and quickly became the fastest-growing piece of software in history. The industry sued Napster and won, and it collapsed even more suddenly than it had arisen.

If Napster had only been about free access, control of legal distribution of music would then have returned the record labels. That’s not what happened. Instead, Pandora happened. Last.fm happened. Spotify happened. ITunes happened. Amazon began selling songs in the hated MP3 format. 

How did the recording industry win the battle but lose the war? How did they achieve such a decisive victory over Napster, then fail to regain control of even legal distribution channels? They crushed Napster’s organization. They poisoned Napster’s brand. They outlawed Napster’s tools. The one thing they couldn’t kill was the story Napster told.

The story the recording industry used to tell us went something like this: “Hey kids, Alanis Morisette just recorded three kickin’ songs! You can have them, so long as you pay for the ten mediocrities she recorded at the same time.” Napster told us a different story. Napster said “You want just the three songs? Fine. Just ‘You Oughta Know’? No problem. Every cover of ‘Blue Suede Shoes’ ever made? Help yourself. You’re in charge.” 

The people in the music industry weren’t stupid, of course. They had access to the same internet the rest of us did. They just couldn’t imagine—and I mean this in the most ordinarily descriptive way possible—could not imagine that the old way of doing things might fail. Yet things did fail, in large part because, after Napster, the industry’s insistence that digital distribution be as expensive and inconvenient as a trip to the record store suddenly struck millions of people as a completely terrible idea. 

Once you see this pattern—a new story rearranging people’s sense of the possible, with the incumbents the last to know—you see it everywhere. First, the people running the old system don’t notice the change. When they do, they assume it’s minor. Then that it’s a niche. Then a fad. And by the time they understand that the world has actually changed, they’ve squandered most of the time they had to adapt.

It’s been interesting watching this unfold in music, books, newspapers, TV, but nothing has ever been as interesting to me as watching it happen in my own backyard. Higher education is now being disrupted; our MP3 is the massive open online course (or MOOC), and our Napster is Udacity, the education startup.

We have several advantages over the recording industry, of course. We are decentralized and mostly non-profit. We employ lots of smart people. We have previous examples to learn from, and our core competence is learning from the past. And armed with these advantages, we’re probably going to screw this up as badly as the music people did.

* * * 

A massive open online class is usually a series of video lectures with associated written materials and self-scoring tests, open to anyone. That’s what makes them OOCs. The M part, though, comes from the world. As we learned from Wikipedia, demand for knowledge is so enormous that good, free online materials can attract extraordinary numbers of people from all over the world. 

Last year, Introduction to Artificial Intelligence, an online course from Stanford taught by Peter Norvig and Sebastian Thrun, attracted 160,000 potential students, of whom 23,000 completed it, a scale that dwarfs anything possible on a physical campus. As Thrun put it, “Peter and I taught more students AI, than all AI professors in the world combined.” Seeing this, he quit and founded Udacity, an educational institution designed to offer MOOCs.

The size of Thrun and Norvig’s course, and the attention attracted by Udacity (and similar organizations like Coursera, P2PU, and University of the People), have many academics worrying about the effect on higher education. The loudest such worrying so far has been The Trouble With Online Education, a New York Times OpEd by Mark Edmunson of the University of Virginia. As most critics do, Edmundson focussed on the issue of quality, asking and answering his own question: “[C]an online education ever be education of the very best sort?”

Now you and I know what he means by “the very best sort”—the intimate college seminar, preferably conducted by tenured faculty. He’s telling the story of the liberal arts education in a selective residential college and asking “Why would anyone take an online class when they can buy a better education at UVA?”

But who faces that choice? Are we to imagine an 18 year old who can set aside $250K and 4 years, but who would have a hard time choosing between a residential college and a series of MOOCs? Elite high school students will not be abandoning elite colleges any time soon; the issue isn’t what education of “the very best sort” looks like, but what the whole system looks like. 

Edmundson isn’t crazy enough to argue that all college experiences are good, so he hedges. He tells us “Every memorable class is a bit like a jazz composition”, without providing an analogy for the non-memorable ones. He assures us that “large lectures can also create genuine intellectual community”, which of course means they can also not do that. (He doesn’t say how many large lectures fail his test.) He says “real courses create intellectual joy,” a statement that can be accurate only as a tautology. (The MOOC Criticism Drinking Game: take a swig whenever someone says “real”, “true”, or “genuine” to hide the fact that they are only talking about elite schools instead of the median college experience.)

I was fortunate enough to get the kind of undergraduate education Edmundson praises: four years at Yale, in an incredible intellectual community, where even big lecture classes were taught by seriously brilliant people. Decades later, I can still remember my art history professor’s description of the Arnolfini Wedding, and the survey of modern poetry didn’t just expose me to Ezra Pound and HD, it changed how I thought about the 20th century.

But you know what? Those classes weren’t like jazz compositions. They didn’t create genuine intellectual community. They didn’t even create ersatz intellectual community. They were just great lectures: we showed up, we listened, we took notes, and we left, ready to discuss what we’d heard in smaller sections.

And did the professors also teach our sections too? No, of course not; those were taught by graduate students. Heaven knows what they were being paid to teach us, but it wasn’t a big fraction of a professor’s salary. The large lecture isn’t a tool for producing intellectual joy; it’s a tool for reducing the expense of introductory classes.

* * *

Higher education has a bad case of cost disease (sometimes called Baumol’s cost disease, after one of its theorizers.) The classic example is the string quartet; performing a 15-minute quartet took a cumulative hour of musician time in 1850, and takes that same hour today. This is not true of the production of food, or clothing, or transportation, all of which have seen massive increases in value created per hour of labor. Unfortunately, the obvious ways to make production more efficient—fewer musicians playing faster—wouldn’t work as well for the production of music as for the production of cars.

An organization with cost disease can use lower paid workers, increase the number of consumers per worker, subsidize production, or increase price. For live music, this means hiring less-talented musicians, selling more tickets per performance, writing grant applications, or, of course, raising ticket prices. For colleges, this means more graduate and adjunct instructors, increased enrollments and class size, fundraising, or, of course, raising tuition.

The great work on college and cost-disease is Robert Archibald and David Feldman’s Why Does College Cost So Much? Archibald and Feldman conclude that institution-specific explanations—spoiled students expecting a climbing wall; management self-aggrandizement at the expense of educational mission—hold up less well than the generic observation: colleges need a lot of highly skilled people, people whose wages, benefits, and support costs have risen faster than inflation for the last thirty years.

Cheap graduate students let a college lower the cost of teaching the sections while continuing to produce lectures as an artisanal product, from scratch, on site, real time. The minute you try to explain exactly why we do it this way, though, the setup starts to seem a little bizarre. What would it be like to teach at a university where a you could only assign books you yourself had written? Where you could only ask your students to read journal articles written by your fellow faculty members? Ridiculous. Unimaginable.

Every college provides access to a huge collection of potential readings, and to a tiny collection of potential lectures. We ask students to read the best works we can find, whoever produced them and where, but we only ask them to listen to the best lecture a local employee can produce that morning. Sometimes you’re at a place where the best lecture your professor can give is the best in the world. But mostly not. And the only thing that kept this system from seeming strange was that we’ve never had a good way of publishing lectures.

This is the huge difference between music and education. Starting with Edison’s wax cylinders, and continuing through to Pandora and the iPod, the biggest change in musical consumption has come not from production but playback. Hearing an excellent string quartet play live in an intimate venue has indeed become a very expensive proposition, as cost disease would suggest, but at the same time, the vast majority of music listened to on any given day is no longer recreated live. 

* * *

Harvard, where I was fortunate enough to have a visiting lectureship a couple of years ago, is our agreed-upon Best Institution, and it is indeed an extraordinary place. But this very transcendence should make us suspicious. Harvard’s endowment, 31 billion dollars, is over three hundred times the median, and only one college in five has an endowment in the first place. Harvard also educates only about a tenth of a percent of the 18 million or so students enrolled in higher education in any given year. Any sentence that begins “Let’s take Harvard as an example…” should immediately be followed up with “No, let’s not do that.”

This atypical bent of our elite institutions covers more than just Harvard. The top 50 colleges on the US News and World Report list (which includes most of the ones you’ve heard of) only educate something like 3% of the current student population. The entire list, about 250 colleges, educates fewer than 25%. 

The upper reaches of the US college system work like a potlatch, those festivals of ostentatious giving. The very things the US News list of top colleges prizes—low average class size, ratio of staff to students—mean that any institution that tries to create a cost-effective education will move down the list. This is why most of the early work on MOOCs is coming out of Stanford and Harvard and MIT. As Ian Bogost says, MOOCs are marketing for elite schools. 

Outside the elite institutions, though, the other 75% of students—over 13 million of them—are enrolled in the four thousand institutions you haven’t heard of: Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College. Bridgerland Applied Technology College. The Laboratory Institute of Merchandising. When we talk about college education in the US, these institutions are usually left out of the conversation, but Clayton State educates as many undergraduates as Harvard. Saint Leo educates twice as many. City College of San Francisco enrolls as many as the entire Ivy League combined. These are where most students are, and their experience is what college education is mostly like.

* * *

The fight over MOOCs isn’t about the value of college; a good chunk of the four thousand institutions you haven’t heard of provide an expensive but mediocre education. For-profit schools like Kaplan’s and the University of Phoenix enroll around one student in eight, but account for nearly half of all loan defaults, and the vast majority of their enrollees fail to get a degree even after six years. Reading the academic press, you wouldn’t think that these statistics represented a more serious defection from our mission than helping people learn something about Artificial Intelligence for free.

The fight over MOOCs isn’t even about the value of online education. Hundreds of institutions already offer online classes for credit, and half a million students are already enrolled in them. If critics of online education were consistent, they would believe that the University of Virginia’s Bachelor of Interdisciplinary Studies or Rutger’s MLIS degreeare abominations, or else they would have to believe that there is a credit-worthy way to do online education, one MOOCs could emulate. Neither argument is much in evidence.

That’s because the fight over MOOCs is really about the story we tell ourselves about higher education: what it is, who it’s for, how it’s delivered, who delivers it. The most widely told story about college focuses obsessively on elite schools and answers a crazy mix of questions: How will we teach complex thinking and skills? How will we turn adolescents into well-rounded members of the middle class? Who will certify that education is taking place? How will we instill reverence for Virgil? Who will subsidize the professor’s work? 

MOOCs simply ignore a lot of those questions. The possibility MOOCs hold out isn’t replacement; anything that could replace the traditional college experience would have to work like one, and the institutions best at working like a college are already colleges. The possibility MOOCs hold out is that the educational parts of education can be unbundled. MOOCs expand the audience for education to people ill-served or completely shut out from the current system, in the same way phonographs expanded the audience for symphonies to people who couldn’t get to a concert hall, and PCs expanded the users of computing power to people who didn’t work in big companies. 

Those earlier inventions systems started out markedly inferior to the high-cost alternative: records were scratchy, PCs were crashy. But first they got better, then they got better than that, and finally, they got so good, for so cheap, that they changed people’s sense of what was possible.

In the US, an undergraduate education used to be an option, one way to get into the middle class. Now it’s a hostage situation, required to avoid falling out of it. And if some of the hostages having trouble coming up with the ransom conclude that our current system is a completely terrible idea, then learning will come unbundled from the pursuit of a degree just as as songs came unbundled from CDs. 

If this happens, Harvard will be fine. Yale will be fine, and Stanford, and Swarthmore, and Duke. But Bridgerland Applied Technology College? Maybe not fine. University of Arkansas at Little Rock? Maybe not fine. And Kaplan College, a more reliable producer of debt than education? Definitely not fine.

* * *

Udacity and its peers don’t even pretend to tell the story of an 18-year old earning a Bachelor’s degree in four years from a selective college, a story that only applies to a small minority of students in the US, much less the world. Meanwhile, they try to answer some new questions, questions that the traditional academy—me and my people—often don’t even recognize as legitimate, like “How do we spin up 10,000 competent programmers a year, all over the world, at a cost too cheap to meter?” 

Udacity may or may not survive, but as with Napster, there’s no containing the story it tells: “It’s possible to educate a thousand people at a time, in a single class, all around the world, for free.” To a traditional academic, this sounds like crazy talk. Earlier this fall, a math instructor writing under the pen name Delta enrolled in Thrun’s Statistics 101class, and, after experiencing it first-hand, concluded that the course was

…amazingly, shockingly awful. It is poorly structured; it evidences an almost complete lack of planning for the lectures; it routinely fails to properly define or use standard terms or notation; it necessitates occasional massive gaps where “magic” happens; and it results in nonstandard computations that would not be accepted in normal statistical work.

Delta posted ten specific criticisms of the the content (Normal Curve Calculations), teaching methods (Quiz Regime) and the MOOC itself (Lack of Updates). About this last one, Delta said:

So in theory, any of the problems that I’ve noted above could be revisited and fixed on future pass-throughs of the course. But will that happen at Udacity, or any other massive online academic program?

The very next day, Thrun answered that question. Conceding that Delta “points out a number of shortcomings that warrant improvements”, Thrun detailed how they were going to update the class. Delta, to his credit, then noted that Thrun had answered several of his criticisms, and went on to tell a depressing story of a fellow instructor at his own institution who had failed to define the mathematical terms he was using despite student requests. 

Tellingly, when Delta was criticizing his peer, he didn’t name the professor, the course, or even his institution. He could observe every aspect of Udacity’s Statistics 101 (as can you) and discuss them in public, but when criticizing his own institution, he pulled his punches.

Open systems are open. For people used to dealing with institutions that go out of their way to hide their flaws, this makes these systems look terrible at first. But anyone who has watched a piece of open source software improve, or remembers the Britannica people throwing tantrums about Wikipedia, has seen how blistering public criticism makes open systems better. And once you imagine educating a thousand people in a single class, it becomes clear that open courses, even in their nascent state, will be able to raise quality and improve certification faster than traditional institutions can lower cost or increase enrollment. 

College mottos run the gamut from Bryn Mawr’s Veritatem Dilexi (I Delight In The Truth) to the Laboratory Institute of Merchandising’s Where Business Meets Fashion, but there’s a new one that now hangs over many of them: Quae Non Possunt Non Manent. Things That Can’t Last Don’t. The cost of attending college is rising above inflation every year, while the premium for doing so shrinks. This obviously can’t last, but no one on the inside has any clear idea about how to change the way our institutions work while leaving our benefits and privileges intact. 

In the academy, we lecture other people every day about learning from history. Now its our turn, and the risk is that we’ll be the last to know that the world has changed, because we can’t imagine—really cannot imagine—that story we tell ourselves about ourselves could start to fail. Even when it’s true. Especially when it’s true.

Wikileaks and the Long Haul

Like a lot of people, I am conflicted about Wikileaks.

Citizens of a functioning democracy must be able to know what the state is saying and doing in our name, to engage in what Pierre Rosanvallon calls “counter-democracy”*, the democracy of citizens distrusting rather than legitimizing the actions of the state. Wikileaks plainly improves those abilities.

On the other hand, human systems can’t stand pure transparency. For negotiation to work, people’s stated positions have to change, but change is seen, almost universally, as weakness. People trying to come to consensus must be able to privately voice opinions they would publicly abjure, and may later abandon. Wikileaks plainly damages those abilities. (If Aaron Bady’s analysis is correct, it is the damage and not the oversight that Wikileaks is designed to create.*)

And so we have a tension between two requirements for democratic statecraft, one that can’t be resolved, but can be brought to an acceptable equilibrium. Indeed, like the virtues of equality vs. liberty, or popular will vs. fundamental rights, it has to be brought into such an equilibrium for democratic statecraft not to be wrecked either by too much secrecy or too much transparency. 

As Tom Slee puts it, “Your answer to ‘what data should the government make public?’ depends not so much on what you think about data, but what you think about the government.”* My personal view is that there is too much secrecy in the current system, and that a corrective towards transparency is a good idea. I don’t, however, believe in pure transparency, and even more importantly, I don’t think that independent actors who are subject to no checks or balances is a good idea in the long haul.

If the long haul were all there was, Wikileaks would be an obviously bad thing. The practical history of politics, however, suggests that the periodic appearance of such unconstrained actors in the short haul is essential to increased democratization, not just of politics but of thought. 

We celebrate the printers of 16th century Amsterdam for making it impossible for the Catholic Church to constrain the output of the printing press to Church-approved books*, a challenge that helped usher in, among other things, the decentralization of scientific inquiry and the spread of politically seditious writings advocating democracy. 

This intellectual and political victory didn’t, however, mean that the printing press was then free of all constraints. Over time, a set of legal limitations around printing rose up, including restrictions on libel, the publication of trade secrets, and sedition. I don’t agree with all of these laws, but they were at least produced by some legal process.

Unlike the United States’ current pursuit of Wikileaks. 

I am conflicted about the right balance between the visibility required for counter-democracy and the need for private speech among international actors. Here’s what I’m not conflicted about: When authorities can’t get what they want by working within the law, the right answer is not to work outside the law. The right answer is that they can’t get what they want.

The Unites States is–or should be–subject to the rule of law, which makes the extra-judicial pursuit of Wikileaks especially nauseating. (Calls for Julian’s assassination are even more nauseating.) It may be that what Julian has done is a crime. (I know him casually, but not well enough to vouch for his motivations, nor am I a lawyer.) In that case, the right answer is to bring the case to a trial. 

IIn the US, however, the government has a “heavy burden” for engaging in prior restraint of even secret documents, an established principle since New York Times Co. vs. The United States*, when the Times published the Pentagon Papers. If we want a different answer for Wikileaks, we need a different legal framework first.

Though I don’t like Senator Joseph Lieberman’s proposed SHIELD law (Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination*), I do like the fact that it is a law, and not an extra-legal avenue (of which Senator Lieberman is also guilty.*) I also like the fact that the SHIELD Law makes it clear what’s at stake: the law proposes new restraints on publishers, and would apply to the New York Times and The Guardian as it well as to Wikileaks. (As Matthew Ingram points out, “Like it or not, Wikileaks is a media entity.”*) SHIELD amounts to an attempt to reverse parts of New York Times Co. vs. The United States.

I don’t think such a law should pass. I think the current laws, which criminalize the leaking of secrets but not the publishing of leaks, strike the right balance. However, as a citizen of a democracy, I’m willing to be voted down, and I’m willing to see other democratically proposed restrictions on Wikileaks put in place. It may even be that whatever checks and balances do get put in place by the democratic process make anything like Wikileaks impossible to sustain in the future. 

The key, though, is that democracies have a process for creating such restrictions, and as a citizen it sickens me to see the US trying to take shortcuts. The leaders of Myanmar and Belarus, or Thailand and Russia, can now rightly say to us “You went after Wikileaks’ domain name, their hosting provider, and even denied your citizens the ability to register protest through donations, all without a warrant and all targeting overseas entities, simply because you decided you don’t like the site. If that’s the way governments get to behave, we can live with that.” 

Over the long haul, we will need new checks and balances for newly increased transparency — Wikileaks shouldn’t be able to operate as a law unto itself anymore than the US should be able to. In the short haul, though, Wikileaks is our Amsterdam. Whatever restrictions we eventually end up enacting, we need to keep Wikileaks alive today, while we work through the process democracies always go through to react to change. If it’s OK for a democracy to just decide to run someone off the internet for doing something they wouldn’t prosecute a newspaper for doing, the idea of an internet that further democratizes the public sphere will have taken a mortal blow.

The Times’ Paywall and Newsletter Economics

It is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.

In early July, Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation placed its two London-based “quality” dailies, the Times and Sunday Times, behind a paywall, charging £1 for 24 hours access, or £2 a week (after an introductory £1 for the first month.*) At the same time, News Corp also forbad the UK’s Audit Bureau of Circulations from reporting site traffic*, so that no meaningful measure of the paywall’s effect was available.

That situation has now been partially reversed, with News reporting some of its own numbers: they claim 105,000 total transactions for digital content between July and October.* (Several people have wrongly reported this as 105,000 users. The number of users is smaller, as there can be more than one transaction per user.) News Corp notes that about half of those transactions were one-offs, meaning only about 50,000 transactions in those four months were by people with any commitment to the site longer than a single day. 

Because that 50K number includes not just web site transactions, but Kindle and iPad sales as well, web subscribers are, at best, in the low tens of thousands. However, we don’t know how small the digital subscriber number is, for two reasons. First, the better the Kindle and iPad numbers are, the worse the web numbers are. Second, News did not report, for example, whether a loyal reader from July to October would count as a single transaction or several consecutive transactions. (If iPad sales are good, and loyal users create multiple transactions, then monthly web subscribers could be under 10,000.) 

The other figure News reported is that something like 100,000 print subscribers have requested web access. Combining digital-only and print subscribers, and comparing them with comScore’s pre-paywall estimate of roughly six million unique readers worldwide*, the reduction in total web audience seems to be on the order of 97%. (Note that this reduction can’t be measured by before and after traffic, as the home pages are outside the paywall, so people who refuse to pay still show up as visitors.)

Because the print subscribers outnumber digital-only users, most of the remaining 3% pay nothing for the site. Subscription to the paper is now a better draw for website use than any case News has been able to make for paid access.

Given the paucity of the data, the key question of churn remains unanswerable. After the introductory £1 a month offer, the annualized rate rises from £12 to £104. This will cause additional users to bail out, but we have no way of guessing how many.

As with every aspect of The Times’ paywall, interpretation of these numbers varies widely. There are people arguing that these numbers are good news; Robert Andrews at PaidContent sees hope in the Times now having recurring user revenues.* There are people arguing that they are bad news; Mike Masnick at TechDirt believes those revenues are unlikely to offset new customer acquition costs and the loss of advertising.* What is remarkable though, what seems to need more explaining than News’s strategy itself, is why anyone regards this particular paywall as news at all.

* * *

The “paywall problem” isn’t particularly complex, either in economic or technological terms. General-interest papers struggle to make paywalls work because it’s hard to raise prices in a commodity market. That’s the problem. Everything else is a detail.

The classic description of a commodity market uses milk. If you own the only cow for 50 miles, you can charge usurious rates, because no one can undercut you. If you own only one of a hundred such cows, though, then everyone can undercut you, so you can’t charge such rates. In a competitive environment like that, milk becomes a commodity, something whose price is set by the market as a whole. 

Owning a newspaper used to be like owning the only cow, especially for regional papers. Even in urban markets, there was enough segmentation–the business paper, the tabloid, the alternative weekly–and high enough costs to keep competition at bay. No longer.

The internet commodifies the business of newspapers. Any given newspaper competes with a few other newspapers, but any newspaper website compete with all other websites. As Nicholas Carr pointed out during the 2009 pirate kidnapping, Google News found 11,264 different sources for the story, all equally accessible.* The web puts newspapers in competition with radio and TV stations, magazines, and new entrants, both professional and amateur. It is the war of each against all.

None of this is new. The potential disruptive effects of the internet on newspapers have been observable since ClariNet in 1989.* Nor has the business case for paywalls changed. The advantage of paywalls is that they raise revenue from users. The disadvantages are that they reduce readership, increase customer acquistion and retention costs, and eliminate ad revenue from user-forwarded content. In most cases, the disadvantages have outweighed the advantages. 

So what’s different about News paywall? Nothing. It’s no different from other pay-for-access plans, whether the NY Times’ TimesSelect* or the Harligen Texas Valley Morning Star.* News Corp has produced no innovation in content, delivery, or payment, and the idea of 90%+ loss of audience was already a rule of thumb over a decade ago. Yet something clearly feels different. 

Over the last fifteen years, many newspaper people have assumed continuity with the analog business model, which is to say they assumed that readers could eventually be persuaded or forced pay for digital editions. This in turn suggested that the failure of any given paywall was no evidence of anything other than the need to try again. 

What is new about the Times’ paywall–what may in fact make it a watershed–isn’t strategy or implementation. What’s new is that it has launched as people in the news business are re-thinking assumed continuity. It’s new because the people paying attention to it are now willing to regard the results as evidence of something. To the newspaper world, TimesSelect looked like an experiment. The Times and Sunday Times look like a referendum on the future.

* * *

One way to escape a commodity market is to offer something that isn’t a commodity. This has been the preferred advice of people committed to the re-invention of newspapers. It is a truism bordering on drinking game material that anyone advising newspapers will at some point say “All you need to do is offer a product so relevant and valuable the consumer is willing to pay for it!”

This advice is well-meaning. It’s just not much help. The suggestion that newspapers should, in the future, create a digital product users are willing to pay for is merely a restatement of the problem, by way of admission that the current product does not pass that test.

Most of the historical hope for paywalls assumed that through some combination of reader desire and supplier persuasiveness, the current form of the newspaper could survive the digital transition without significant alteration.

Payalls, as actually implemented, have not accomplished this. They don’t expand revenue from the existing audience, they contract the audience to that subset willing to pay. Paywalls do indeed help newspapers escape commodification, but only by ejecting the readers who think of the product as a commodity. This is, invariably, most of them.

* * *

You can see this contraction at the Times and Sunday Times in the reversal of digital to print readers. Before the paywall, the two sites had roughly six times more readers than there were print sales of the paper edition. (6M web vs. 1M print for the Sunday Times* .) Post-paywall, the web audience is less than a sixth of print sales (down to <150K vs. 1M). The paying web audience is less a twentieth of print sales (<50K vs. 1M), and possibly much less. 

One way to think of this transition is that online, the Times has stopped being a newspaper, in the sense of a generally available and omnibus account of the news of the day, broadly read in the community. Instead, it is becoming a newsletter, an outlet supported by, and speaking to, a specific and relatively coherent and compact audience. (In this case, the Times is becoming the online newsletter of the Tories, the UK’s conservative political party, read much less widely than its paper counterpart.)

Murdoch and News Corp, committed as they have been to extracting revenues from the paywall, still cannot execute in a way that does not change the nature of the organizations behind the wall. Rather than simply shifting relative subsidy from advertisers to users for an existing product, they are instead re-engineering the Times around the newsletter model, because the paywall creates newsletter economics. 

As of July, non-subscribers can no longer read Times stories forwarded by colleagues or friends, nor can they read stories linked to from Facebook or Twitter. As a result, links to Times stories now rarely circulate in those media. If you are going to produce news that can’t be shared outside a particular community, you will want to recruit and retain a community that doesn’t care whether any given piece of news spreads, which means tightly interconnected readerships become the ideal ones. However, tight interconnectedness correlates inversely with audience size, making for a stark choice, rather than offering a way of preserving the status quo.

This re-engineering suggests that paywalls don’t and can’t rescue current organizational forms. They offer instead yet another transformed alternative to it. Even if paywall economics can eventually be made to work with a dramatically reduced audience, this particular referendum on the future (read: the present) of newspapers is likely to mean the end of the belief that there is any non-disruptive way to remain a going concern.


I’ve bundled some replies to various questions in the comments from November 9th here and from November 10th here.

Also, nota bene: One of the problems with the various “Hey you guys, I just had a great idea for saving newpapers!” micropayment comments showing up in my moderation queue is that the proposers often exhibit no understanding that micropayments have a 20-year history of failure. 

I will not post comments suggesting that micropayments will save the news industry unless those comment refer to at least some of the theoretical or practical literature on previous attempts to make them work for the news business. Start here: Why Small Payments Won’t Save Publishers

The Collapse of Complex Business Models

I gave a talk last year to a group of TV executives gathered for an annual conference. From the Q&A after, it was clear that for them, the question wasn’t whether the internet was going to alter their business, but about the mode and tempo of that alteration. Against that background, though, they were worried about a much more practical matter: When, they asked, would online video generate enough money to cover their current costs?

That kind of question comes up a lot. It’s a tough one to answer, not just because the answer is unlikely to make anybody happy, but because the premise is more important than the question itself. 

There are two essential bits of background here. The first is that most TV is made by for-profit companies, and there are two ways to generate a profit: raise revenues above expenses, or cut expenses below revenues. The other is that, for many media business, that second option is unreachable. 

Here’s why.

* * *

In 1988, Joseph Tainter wrote a chilling book called The Collapse of Complex Societies. Tainter looked at several societies that gradually arrived at a level of remarkable sophistication then suddenly collapsed: the Romans, the Lowlands Maya, the inhabitants of Chaco canyon. Every one of those groups had rich traditions, complex social structures, advanced technology, but despite their sophistication, they collapsed, impoverishing and scattering their citizens and leaving little but future archeological sites as evidence of previous greatness. Tainter asked himself whether there was some explanation common to these sudden dissolutions.

The answer he arrived at was that they hadn’t collapsed despite their cultural sophistication, they’d collapsed because of it. Subject to violent compression, Tainter’s story goes like this: a group of people, through a combination of social organization and environmental luck, finds itself with a surplus of resources. Managing this surplus makes society more complex—agriculture rewards mathematical skill, granaries require new forms of construction, and so on. 

Early on, the marginal value of this complexity is positive—each additional bit of complexity more than pays for itself in improved output—but over time, the law of diminishing returns reduces the marginal value, until it disappears completely. At this point, any additional complexity is pure cost.

Tainter’s thesis is that when society’s elite members add one layer of bureaucracy or demand one tribute too many, they end up extracting all the value from their environment it is possible to extract and then some. 

The ‘and them some’ is what causes the trouble. Complex societies collapse because, when some stress comes, those societies have become too inflexible to respond. In retrospect, this can seem mystifying. Why didn’t these societies just re-tool in less complex ways? The answer Tainter gives is the simplest one: When societies fail to respond to reduced circumstances through orderly downsizing, it isn’t because they don’t want to, it’s because they can’t. 

In such systems, there is no way to make things a little bit simpler – the whole edifice becomes a huge, interlocking system not readily amenable to change. Tainter doesn’t regard the sudden decoherence of these societies as either a tragedy or a mistake—”[U]nder a situation of declining marginal returns collapse may be the most appropriate response”, to use his pitiless phrase. Furthermore, even when moderate adjustments could be made, they tend to be resisted, because any simplification discomfits elites. 

When the value of complexity turns negative, a society plagued by an inability to react remains as complex as ever, right up to the moment where it becomes suddenly and dramatically simpler, which is to say right up to the moment of collapse. Collapse is simply the last remaining method of simplification.

* * *

In the mid-90s, I got a call from some friends at ATT, asking me to help them research the nascent web-hosting business. They thought ATT’s famous “five 9’s” reliability (services that work 99.999% of the time) would be valuable, but they couldn’t figure out how $20 a month, then the going rate, could cover the costs for good web hosting, much less leave a profit.

I started describing the web hosting I’d used, including the process of developing web sites locally, uploading them to the server, and then checking to see if anything had broken.

“But if you don’t have a staging server, you’d be changing things on the live site!” They explained this to me in the tone you’d use to explain to a small child why you don’t want to drink bleach. “Oh yeah, it was horrible”, I said. “Sometimes the servers would crash, and we’d just have to re-boot and start from scratch.” There was a long silence on the other end, the silence peculiar to conference calls when an entire group stops to think. 

The ATT guys had correctly understood that the income from $20-a-month customers wouldn’t pay for good web hosting. What they hadn’t understood, were in fact professionally incapable of understanding, was that the industry solution, circa 1996, was to offer hosting that wasn’t very good. 

This, for the ATT guys, wasn’t depressing so much as confusing. We finished up the call, and it was polite enough, but it was perfectly clear that there wasn’t going to be a consulting gig out of it, because it wasn’t a market they could get into, not because they didn’t want to, but because they couldn’t.

It would be easy to regard this as short-sighted on their part, but that ignores the realities of culture. For a century, ATT’s culture had prized—insisted on—quality of service; they ran their own power grid to keep the dial-tone humming during blackouts. ATT, like most organizations, could not be good at the thing it was good at and good at the opposite thing at the same time. The web hosting business, because it followed the “Simplicity first, quality later” model, didn’t just present a new market, it required new cultural imperatives.* * *

Dr. Amy Smith is a professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at MIT, where she runs the Development Lab, or D-Lab, a lab organized around simple and cheap engineering solutions for the developing world. 

Among the rules of thumb she offers for building in that environment is this: “If you want something to be 10 times cheaper, take out 90% of the materials.” Making media is like that now except, for “materials”, substitute “labor.”

* * *

About 15 years ago, the supply part of media’s supply-and-demand curve went parabolic, with a predictably inverse effect on price. Since then, a battalion of media elites have lined up to declare that exactly the opposite thing will start happening any day now. 

To pick a couple of examples more or less at random, last year Barry Diller of IAC said, of content available on the web, “It is not free, and is not going to be,” Steve Brill of Journalism Online said that users “just need to get back into the habit of doing so [paying for content] online”, and Rupert Murdoch of News Corp said “Web users will have to pay for what they watch and use.”

Diller, Brill, and Murdoch seem be stating a simple fact—we will have to pay them—but this fact is not in fact a fact. Instead, it is a choice, one its proponents often decline to spell out in full, because, spelled out in full, it would read something like this:

“Web users will have to pay for what they watch and use, or else we will have to stop making content in the costly and complex way we have grown accustomed to making it. And we don’t know how to do that.”

* * *

One of the interesting questions about Tainter’s thesis is whether markets and democracy, the core mechanisms of the modern world, will let us avoid complexity-driven collapse, by keeping any one group of elites from seizing unbroken control. This is, as Tainter notes in his book, an open question. There is, however, one element of complex society into which neither markets nor democracy reach—bureaucracy.

Bureaucracies temporarily suspend the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In a bureaucracy, it’s easier to make a process more complex than to make it simpler, and easier to create a new burden than kill an old one. 

In spring of 2007, the web video comedy In the Motherhood made the move to TV. In the Motherhood started online as a series of short videos, with viewers contributing funny stories from their own lives and voting on their favorites. This tactic generated good ideas at low cost as well as endearing the show to its viewers; the show’s tag line was “By Moms, For Moms, About Moms.”

The move to TV was an affirmation of this technique; when ABC launched the public forum for the new TV version, they told users their input “might just become inspiration for a story by the writers.”

Or it might not. Once the show moved to television, the Writers Guild of America got involved. They were OK with For and About Moms, but By Moms violated Guild rules. The producers tried to negotiate, to no avail, so the idea of audience engagement was canned (as was In the Motherhood itself some months later, after failing to engage viewers as the web version had).

The critical fact about this negotiation wasn’t about the mothers, or their stories, or how those stories might be used. The critical fact was that the negotiation took place in the grid of the television industry, between entities incorporated around a 20th century business logic, and entirely within invented constraints. At no point did the negotiation about audience involvement hinge on the question “Would this be an interesting thing to try?”

* * *

Here is the answer to that question from the TV executives. 

In the future, at least some methods of producing video for the web will become as complex, with as many details to attend to, as television has today, and people will doubtless make pots of money on those forms of production. It’s tempting, at least for the people benefitting from the old complexity, to imagine that if things used to be complex, and they’re going to be complex, then everything can just stay complex in the meantime. That’s not how it works, however. 

The most watched minute of video made in the last five years shows baby Charlie biting his brother’s finger. (Twice!) That minute has been watched by more people than the viewership of American Idol, Dancing With The Stars, and the Superbowl combined. (174 million views and counting.)

Some video still has to be complex to be valuable, but the logic of the old media ecoystem, where video had to be complex simply to be video, is broken. Expensive bits of video made in complex ways now compete with cheap bits made in simple ways. “Charlie Bit My Finger” was made by amateurs, in one take, with a lousy camera. No professionals were involved in selecting or editing or distributing it. Not one dime changed hands anywhere between creator, host, and viewers. A world where that is the kind of thing that just happens from time to time is a world where complexity is neither an absolute requirement nor an automatic advantage. 

When ecosystems change and inflexible institutions collapse, their members disperse, abandoning old beliefs, trying new things, making their living in different ways than they used to. It’s easy to see the ways in which collapse to simplicity wrecks the glories of old. But there is one compensating advantage for the people who escape the old system: when the ecosystem stops rewarding complexity, it is the people who figure out how to work simply in the present, rather than the people who mastered the complexities of the past, who get to say what happens in the future.

Newspapers and Thinking the Unthinkable

Back in 1993, the Knight-Ridder newspaper chain began investigating piracy of Dave Barry’s popular column, which was published by the Miami Herald and syndicated widely. In the course of tracking down the sources of unlicensed distribution, they found many things, including the copying of his column to alt.fan.dave_barry on usenet; a 2000-person strong mailing list also reading pirated versions; and a teenager in the Midwest who was doing some of the copying himself, because he loved Barry’s work so much he wanted everybody to be able to read it.

One of the people I was hanging around with online back then was Gordy Thompson, who managed internet services at the New York Times. I remember Thompson saying something to the effect of “When a 14 year old kid can blow up your business in his spare time, not because he hates you but because he loves you, then you got a problem.” I think about that conversation a lot these days.

The problem newspapers face isn’t that they didn’t see the internet coming. They not only saw it miles off, they figured out early on that they needed a plan to deal with it, and during the early 90s they came up with not just one plan but several. One was to partner with companies like America Online, a fast-growing subscription service that was less chaotic than the open internet. Another plan was to educate the public about the behaviors required of them by copyright law. New payment models such as micropayments were proposed. Alternatively, they could pursue the profit margins enjoyed by radio and TV, if they became purely ad-supported. Still another plan was to convince tech firms to make their hardware and software less capable of sharing, or to partner with the businesses running data networks to achieve the same goal. Then there was the nuclear option: sue copyright infringers directly, making an example of them.

As these ideas were articulated, there was intense debate about the merits of various scenarios. Would DRM or walled gardens work better? Shouldn’t we try a carrot-and-stick approach, with education and prosecution? And so on. In all this conversation, there was one scenario that was widely regarded as unthinkable, a scenario that didn’t get much discussion in the nation’s newsrooms, for the obvious reason.

The unthinkable scenario unfolded something like this: The ability to share content wouldn’t shrink, it would grow. Walled gardens would prove unpopular. Digital advertising would reduce inefficiencies, and therefore profits. Dislike of micropayments would prevent widespread use. People would resist being educated to act against their own desires. Old habits of advertisers and readers would not transfer online. Even ferocious litigation would be inadequate to constrain massive, sustained law-breaking. (Prohibition redux.) Hardware and software vendors would not regard copyright holders as allies, nor would they regard customers as enemies. DRM’s requirement that the attacker be allowed to decode the content would be an insuperable flaw. And, per Thompson, suing people who love something so much they want to share it would piss them off.

Revolutions create a curious inversion of perception. In ordinary times, people who do no more than describe the world around them are seen as pragmatists, while those who imagine fabulous alternative futures are viewed as radicals. The last couple of decades haven’t been ordinary, however. Inside the papers, the pragmatists were the ones simply looking out the window and noticing that the real world was increasingly resembling the unthinkable scenario. These people were treated as if they were barking mad. Meanwhile the people spinning visions of popular walled gardens and enthusiastic micropayment adoption, visions unsupported by reality, were regarded not as charlatans but saviors.

When reality is labeled unthinkable, it creates a kind of sickness in an industry. Leadership becomes faith-based, while employees who have the temerity to suggest that what seems to be happening is in fact happening are herded into Innovation Departments, where they can be ignored en masse. This shunting aside of the realists in favor of the fabulists has different effects on different industries at different times. One of the effects on the newspapers is that many of their most passionate defenders are unable, even now, to plan for a world in which the industry they knew is visibly going away.* * *

The curious thing about the various plans hatched in the ’90s is that they were, at base, all the same plan: “Here’s how we’re going to preserve the old forms of organization in a world of cheap perfect copies!” The details differed, but the core assumption behind all imagined outcomes (save the unthinkable one) was that the organizational form of the newspaper, as a general-purpose vehicle for publishing a variety of news and opinion, was basically sound, and only needed a digital facelift. As a result, the conversation has degenerated into the enthusiastic grasping at straws, pursued by skeptical responses.

“The Wall Street Journal has a paywall, so we can too!” (Financial information is one of the few kinds of information whose recipients don’t want to share.) “Micropayments work for iTunes, so they will work for us!” (Micropayments work only where the provider can avoid competitive business models.) “The New York Times should charge for content!” (They’ve tried, with QPass and later TimesSelect.) “Cook’s Illustrated and Consumer Reports are doing fine on subscriptions!” (Those publications forgo ad revenues; users are paying not just for content but for unimpeachability.) “We’ll form a cartel!” (…and hand a competitive advantage to every ad-supported media firm in the world.)

Round and round this goes, with the people committed to saving newspapers demanding to know “If the old model is broken, what will work in its place?” To which the answer is: Nothing. Nothing will work. There is no general model for newspapers to replace the one the internet just broke. 

With the old economics destroyed, organizational forms perfected for industrial production have to be replaced with structures optimized for digital data. It makes increasingly less sense even to talk about a publishing industry, because the core problem publishing solves — the incredible difficulty, complexity, and expense of making something available to the public — has stopped being a problem.* * *

Elizabeth Eisenstein’s magisterial treatment of Gutenberg’s invention, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, opens with a recounting of her research into the early history of the printing press. She was able to find many descriptions of life in the early 1400s, the era before movable type. Literacy was limited, the Catholic Church was the pan-European political force, Mass was in Latin, and the average book was the Bible. She was also able to find endless descriptions of life in the late 1500s, after Gutenberg’s invention had started to spread. Literacy was on the rise, as were books written in contemporary languages, Copernicus had published his epochal work on astronomy, and Martin Luther’s use of the press to reform the Church was upending both religious and political stability.

What Eisenstein focused on, though, was how many historians ignored the transition from one era to the other. To describe the world before or after the spread of print was child’s play; those dates were safely distanced from upheaval. But what was happening in 1500? The hard question Eisenstein’s book asks is “How did we get from the world before the printing press to the world after it? What was the revolution itself like?”

Chaotic, as it turns out. The Bible was translated into local languages; was this an educational boon or the work of the devil? Erotic novels appeared, prompting the same set of questions. Copies of Aristotle and Galen circulated widely, but direct encounter with the relevant texts revealed that the two sources clashed, tarnishing faith in the Ancients. As novelty spread, old institutions seemed exhausted while new ones seemed untrustworthy; as a result, people almost literally didn’t know what to think. If you can’t trust Aristotle, who can you trust?

During the wrenching transition to print, experiments were only revealed in retrospect to be turning points. Aldus Manutius, the Venetian printer and publisher, invented the smaller octavo volume along with italic type. What seemed like a minor change — take a book and shrink it — was in retrospect a key innovation in the democratization of the printed word. As books became cheaper, more portable, and therefore more desirable, they expanded the market for all publishers, heightening the value of literacy still further.

That is what real revolutions are like. The old stuff gets broken faster than the new stuff is put in its place. The importance of any given experiment isn’t apparent at the moment it appears; big changes stall, small changes spread. Even the revolutionaries can’t predict what will happen. Agreements on all sides that core institutions must be protected are rendered meaningless by the very people doing the agreeing. (Luther and the Church both insisted, for years, that whatever else happened, no one was talking about a schism.) Ancient social bargains, once disrupted, can neither be mended nor quickly replaced, since any such bargain takes decades to solidify.

And so it is today. When someone demands to know how we are going to replace newspapers, they are really demanding to be told that we are not living through a revolution. They are demanding to be told that old systems won’t break before new systems are in place. They are demanding to be told that ancient social bargains aren’t in peril, that core institutions will be spared, that new methods of spreading information will improve previous practice rather than upending it. They are demanding to be lied to.

There are fewer and fewer people who can convincingly tell such a lie. * * *

If you want to know why newspapers are in such trouble, the most salient fact is this: Printing presses are terrifically expensive to set up and to run. This bit of economics, normal since Gutenberg, limits competition while creating positive returns to scale for the press owner, a happy pair of economic effects that feed on each other. In a notional town with two perfectly balanced newspapers, one paper would eventually generate some small advantage — a breaking story, a key interview — at which point both advertisers and readers would come to prefer it, however slightly. That paper would in turn find it easier to capture the next dollar of advertising, at lower expense, than the competition. This would increase its dominance, which would further deepen those preferences, repeat chorus. The end result is either geographic or demographic segmentation among papers, or one paper holding a monopoly on the local mainstream audience. 

For a long time, longer than anyone in the newspaper business has been alive in fact, print journalism has been intertwined with these economics. The expense of printing created an environment where Wal-Mart was willing to subsidize the Baghdad bureau. This wasn’t because of any deep link between advertising and reporting, nor was it about any real desire on the part of Wal-Mart to have their marketing budget go to international correspondents. It was just an accident. Advertisers had little choice other than to have their money used that way, since they didn’t really have any other vehicle for display ads. 

The old difficulties and costs of printing forced everyone doing it into a similar set of organizational models; it was this similarity that made us regard  Daily Racing Form and L’Osservatore Romano as being in the same business. That the relationship between advertisers, publishers, and journalists has been ratified by a century of cultural practice doesn’t make it any less accidental.

The competition-deflecting effects of printing cost got destroyed by the internet, where everyone pays for the infrastructure, and then everyone gets to use it. And when Wal-Mart, and the local Maytag dealer, and the law firm hiring a secretary, and that kid down the block selling his bike, were all able to use that infrastructure to get out of their old relationship with the publisher, they did. They’d never really signed up to fund the Baghdad bureau anyway.* * *

Print media does much of society’s heavy journalistic lifting, from flooding the zone — covering every angle of a huge story — to the daily grind of attending the City Council meeting, just in case. This coverage creates benefits even for people who aren’t newspaper readers, because the work of print journalists is used by everyone from politicians to district attorneys to talk radio hosts to bloggers. The newspaper people often note that newspapers benefit society as a whole. This is true, but irrelevant to the problem at hand; “You’re gonna miss us when we’re gone!” has never been much of a business model. So who covers all that news if some significant fraction of the currently employed newspaper people lose their jobs?

I don’t know. Nobody knows. We’re collectively living through 1500, when it’s easier to see what’s broken than what will replace it. The internet turns 40 this fall. Access by the general public is less than half that age. Web use, as a normal part of life for a majority of the developed world, is less than half that age. We just got here. Even the revolutionaries can’t predict what will happen.

Imagine, in 1996, asking some net-savvy soul to expound on the potential of craigslist, then a year old and not yet incorporated. The answer you’d almost certainly have gotten would be extrapolation: “Mailing lists can be powerful tools”, “Social effects are intertwining with digital networks”, blah blah blah. What no one would have told you, could have told you, was what actually happened: craiglist became a critical piece of infrastructure. Not the idea of craigslist, or the business model, or even the software driving it. Craigslist itself spread to cover hundreds of cities and has become a part of public consciousness about what is now possible. Experiments are only revealed in retrospect to be turning points.

In craigslist’s gradual shift from ‘interesting if minor’ to ‘essential and transformative’, there is one possible answer to the question “If the old model is broken, what will work in its place?” The answer is: Nothing will work, but everything might. Now is the time for experiments, lots and lots of experiments, each of which will seem as minor at launch as craigslist did, as Wikipedia did, as octavo volumes did.

Journalism has always been subsidized. Sometimes it’s been Wal-Mart and the kid with the bike. Sometimes it’s been Richard Mellon Scaife. Increasingly, it’s you and me, donating our time. The list of models that are obviously working today, like Consumer Reports and NPR, like ProPublica and WikiLeaks, can’t be expanded to cover any general case, but then nothing is going to cover the general case. 

Society doesn’t need newspapers. What we need is journalism. For a century, the imperatives to strengthen journalism and to strengthen newspapers have been so tightly wound as to be indistinguishable. That’s been a fine accident to have, but when that accident stops, as it is stopping before our eyes, we’re going to need lots of other ways to strengthen journalism instead. 

When we shift our attention from ’save newspapers’ to ’save society’, the imperative changes from ‘preserve the current institutions’ to ‘do whatever works.’ And what works today isn’t the same as what used to work.

We don’t know who the Aldus Manutius of the current age is. It could be Craig Newmark, or Caterina Fake. It could be Martin Nisenholtz, or Emily Bell. It could be some 19 year old kid few of us have heard of, working on something we won’t recognize as vital until a decade hence. Any experiment, though, designed to provide new models for journalism is going to be an improvement over hiding from the real, especially in a year when, for many papers, the unthinkable future is already in the past.

For the next few decades, journalism will be made up of overlapping special cases. Many of these models will rely on amateurs as researchers and writers. Many of these models will rely on sponsorship or grants or endowments instead of revenues. Many of these models will rely on excitable 14 year olds distributing the results. Many of these models will fail. No one experiment is going to replace what we are now losing with the demise of news on paper, but over time, the collection of new experiments that do work might give us the journalism we need.

Why Small Payments Won’t Save Publishers

With continued turmoil in the advertising market, people who work at newspapers and magazines are wondering if micropayments will save them, with recent speculation in this direction by David Sarno of the LA TimesDavid Carr of the NY Times, and Walter Isaacson in Time magazine. Unfortunately for the optimists, micropayments — small payments made by readers for individual articles or other pieces of a la carte content — won’t work for online journalism. 

To understand why not, there are two key pieces of background. 

First, the label micropayments no longer makes any sense. Some of the early proposals for small payment systems did indeed imagine digital bookkeeping and billing for amounts as small as a thousandth of a cent; this was what made such payments “micro”. Current proposals, however, imagine pricing digital content in the range of a dime to a dollar. These aren’t micro-anything, they are just ordinary but small payments, no magic anywhere.

The essential thing to understand about small payments is that users don’t like being nickel-and-dimed. We have the phrase ‘nickel-and-dimed’ because this dislike is both general and strong. The result is that small payment systems don’t survive contact with online markets, because we express our hatred of small payments by switching to alternatives, whether supported by subscription or subsidy.

The other key piece of background isn’t about small payments themselves, but about the conversation. Such systems solve no problem the user has, and offer no service we want. As a result, conversations about small payments take place entirely among content providers, never involving us, the people who will ostensibly be funding these transactions. The conversation about small payments is also not a normal part of the conversation among publishers. Instead, the word ‘micropayment’ is a trope for desperation, entering the vernacular of a given media market only after threats to older models become visibly dire (as with the failed attempts to adopt small payments for webzines in the late ’90s, or for solo content like web comics and blogs earlier in this decade.)

The invocation of micropayments involves a displaced fantasy that the publishers of digital content can re-assert control over we unruly users in a media environment with low barriers to entry for competition. News that this has been tried many times in the past and has not worked is unwelcome precisely because if small payment systems won’t save existing publishers in their current form, there might not be a way to save existing publishers in their current form (an outcome generally regarded as unthinkable by existing publishers.)

Faith in salvation from small payments all but requires the adherent to ignore the past, whether existing critiques (e.g. Szabo 1996; Shirky 20002003; Odlyzko 2003) or previous failures. Isaacson’s recent Time magazine cover story on micropayments, How to Save Your Newspaper, a classic of the form, recapitulates the argument put forward by Scott McCloud in his 2003 Misunderstanding Micropayments. That McCloud advanced the same argument that Isaacson does, and that the small payment system McCloud was proselytizing for failed exactly as predicted, seems not to have troubled Isaacson much, even though he offers no argument different from McCloud’s. 

Another strategy among the faithful is to extrapolate from systems that do rely on small payments: iTunes, ringtone sales, or sales of digital goods in environments such as Cyworld. (This is the idea explored by David Carr in Let’s Invent an iTunes for News.) The lesson of iTunes et al (indeed, the only real lesson of small payment systems generally) is that if you want something that doesn’t survive contact with the market, you can’t let it have contact with the market. 

Cyworld, a wildly popular online forum in Korea, is able to collect small payments for digital items, denominated in a currency called Dotori (“acorn”), because once a user is in Cyworld, SK Telecom, the corporate parent, controls all the distribution options. A Cyworld user who wants a certain kind of digital decoration for their online presence has to buy it through Cyworld if they want it; the monopoly within the environment is enough to prevent competition for pricing of digital goods. Similarly, mobile phone carriers go to great lengths to prevent the ringtone distribution network from becoming general-purpose, lest freely circulating mp3s drive the price to zero. In these cases, control over the users’ environment is essential to preventing competition from destroying the payment model.

Apple’s ITMS (iTunes Music Store) is perhaps the most interesting example. People are not paying for music on ITMS because we have decided that fee-per-track is the model we prefer, but because there is no market in which commercial alternatives can be explored. Everything from Napster to online radio has been crippled or killed by fiat; small payments survive in the absence of a market for other legal options. What’s interesting about ITMS, though, it that it contains other content that illustrates the dilemma of the journalists most sharply: podcasts. Apple has the machinery in place to charge for podcasts. Why don’t they? 

Because they can’t afford to. Were they to start charging, their users would start looking around for other sources, as podcasts are offered free elsewhere. Losing user attention would be anathema to a company that wants as tight a relationship between ITMS and the iPod as it can get; the potential revenues are not worth the erosion of audience. 

Without the RIAA et al, Apple is unable to corner the market on podcasts, and thus unable to charge. Unless Apple could get the world’s unruly podcasters to behave as a cartel, and convince all new entrants to forgo the resulting vacuum of attention, podcasts will continue to circulate without individual payments. With every single tool in place to have a functioning small payment sytem, even Apple can’t defy the users if there is any way for us to express our preferences. 

Which brings us to us. 

Because small payment systems are always discussed in conversations by and for publishers, readers are assigned no independent role. In every micropayments fantasy, there is a sentence or section asserting that what the publishers want will be just fine with us, and, critically, that we will be possessed of no desires of our own that would interfere with that fantasy.

Meanwhile, back in the real world, the media business is being turned upside down by our new freedoms and our new roles. We’re not just readers anymore, or listeners or viewers. We’re not customers and we’re certainly not consumers. We’re users. We don’t consume content, we use it, and mostly what we use it for is to support our conversations with one another, because we’re media outlets now too. When I am talking about some event that just happened, whether it’s an earthquake or a basketball game, whether the conversation is in email or Facebook or Twitter, I want to link to what I’m talking about, and I want my friends to be able to read it easily, and to share it with their friends. 

This is superdistribution — content moving from friend to friend through the social network, far from the original source of the story. Superdistribution, despite its unweildy name, matters to users. It matters a lot. It matters so much, in fact, that we will routinely prefer a shareable amateur source to a professional source that requires us to keep the content a secret on pain of lawsuit. (Wikipedia’s historical advantage over Britannica in one sentence.) 

Nickel-and-dimeing us for access to content made less useful by those very restrictions simply isn’t appealing. Newspapers can’t entice us into small payment systems, because we care too much about our conversation with one another, and they can’t force us into such systems, because Off the Bus and Pro Publica and Gawker and Global Voices and Ohmynews and Spot.us and Smoking Gun all understand that not only is a news cartel unworkable, but that if one existed, their competitive advantage would be in attacking it rather than defending it.

The threat from micropayments isn’t that they will come to pass. The threat is that talking about them will waste our time, and now is not the time to be wasting time. The internet really is a revolution for the media ecology, and the changes it is forcing on existing models are large. What matters at newspapers and magazines isn’t publishing, it’s reporting. We should be talking about new models for employing reporters rather than resuscitating old models for employing publishers; the more time we waste fantasizing about magic solutions for the latter problem, the less time we have to figure out real solutions to the former one.

Ontology is Overrated: Categories, Links, and Tags

Ontology is Overrated: Categories, Links, and Tags

This piece is based on two talks I gave in the spring of 2005—one at the O’Reilly ETech conference in March, entitled “Ontology Is Overrated”, and one at the IMCExpo in April entitled “Folksonomies & Tags: The rise of user-developed classification.” The written version is a heavily edited concatenation of those two talks. 

Today I want to talk about categorization, and I want to convince you that a lot of what we think we know about categorization is wrong. In particular, I want to convince you that many of the ways we’re attempting to apply categorization to the electronic world are actually a bad fit, because we’ve adopted habits of mind that are left over from earlier strategies. 

I also want to convince you that what we’re seeing when we see the Web is actually a radical break with previous categorization strategies, rather than an extension of them. The second part of the talk is more speculative, because it is often the case that old systems get broken before people know what’s going to take their place. (Anyone watching the music industry can see this at work today.) That’s what I think is happening with categorization.

What I think is coming instead are much more organic ways of organizing information than our current categorization schemes allow, based on two units — the link, which can point to anything, and the tag, which is a way of attaching labels to links. The strategy of tagging — free-form labeling, without regard to categorical constraints — seems like a recipe for disaster, but as the Web has shown us, you can extract a surprising amount of value from big messy data sets. 

PART I: Classification and Its Discontents #

Q: What is Ontology? A: It Depends on What the Meaning of “Is” Is. #

I need to provide some quick definitions, starting with ontology. It is a rich irony that the word “ontology”, which has to do with making clear and explicit statements about entities in a particular domain, has so many conflicting definitions. I’ll offer two general ones. 

The main thread of ontology in the philosophical sense is the study of entities and their relations. The question ontology asks is: What kinds of things exist or can exist in the world, and what manner of relations can those things have to each other? Ontology is less concerned with what is than with what is possible.

The knowledge management and AI communities have a related definition — they’ve taken the word “ontology” and applied it more directly to their problem. The sense of ontology there is something like “an explicit specification of a conceptualization.” 

The common thread between the two definitions is essence, “Is-ness.” In a particular domain, what kinds of things can we say exist in that domain, and how can we say those things relate to each other?

I need to provide some quick definitions, starting with ontology. It is a rich irony that the word “ontology”, which has to do with making clear and explicit statements about entities in a particular domain, has so many conflicting definitions. I’ll offer two general ones. 

The main thread of ontology in the philosophical sense is the study of entities and their relations. The question ontology asks is: What kinds of things exist or can exist in the world, and what manner of relations can those things have to each other? Ontology is less concerned with what is than with what is possible.

The knowledge management and AI communities have a related definition — they’ve taken the word “ontology” and applied it more directly to their problem. The sense of ontology there is something like “an explicit specification of a conceptualization.” 

The common thread between the two definitions is essence, “Is-ness.” In a particular domain, what kinds of things can we say exist in that domain, and how can we say those things relate to each other?

The other pair of terms I need to define are categorization and classification. These are the act of organizing a collection of entities, whether things or concepts, into related groups. Though there are some field-by-field distinctions, the terms are in the main used interchangeably.

And then there’s ontological classification or categorization, which is organizing a set of entities into groups, based on their essences and possible relations. A library catalog, for example, assumes that for any new book, its logical place already exists within the system, even before the book was published. That strategy of designing categories to cover possible cases in advance is what I’m primarily concerned with, because it is both widely used and badly overrated in terms of its value in the digital world.

Now, anyone who deals with categorization for a living will tell you they can never get a perfect system. In working classification systems, success is not “Did we get the ideal arrangement?” but rather “How close did we come, and on what measures?” The idea of a perfect scheme is simply a Platonic ideal. However, I want to argue that even the ontological ideal is a mistake. Even using theoretical perfection as a measure of practical success leads to misapplication of resources.

Now, to the problems of classification. 

Cleaving Nature at the Joints #

The Periodic Table of the Elements
The Periodic Table of the Elements

The periodic table of the elements is my vote for “Best. Classification. Evar.” It turns out that by organizing elements by the number of protons in the nucleus, you get all of this fantastic value, both descriptive and predictive value. And because what you’re doing is organizing things, the periodic table is as close to making assertions about essence as it is physically possible to get. This is a really powerful scheme, almost perfect. Almost.

All the way over in the right-hand column, the pink column, are noble gases. Now noble gas is an odd category, because helium is no more a gas than mercury is a liquid. Helium is not fundamentally a gas, it’s just a gas at most temperatures, but the people studying it at the time didn’t know that, because they weren’t able to make it cold enough to see that helium, like everything else, has different states of matter. Lacking the right measurements, they assumed that gaseousness was an essential aspect — literally, part of the essence — of those elements.

Even in a nearly perfect categorization scheme, there are these kinds of context errors, where people are placing something that is merely true at room temperature, and is absolutely unrelated to essence, right in the center of the categorization. And the category ‘Noble Gas’ has stayed there from the day they added it, because we’ve all just gotten used to that anomaly as a frozen accident.

If it’s impossible to create a completely coherent categorization, even when you’re doing something as physically related to essence as chemistry, imagine the problems faced by anyone who’s dealing with a domain where essence is even less obvious. 

Which brings me to the subject of libraries.

Of Cards and Catalogs #

The periodic table gets my vote for the best categorization scheme ever, but libraries have the best-known categorization schemes. The experience of the library catalog is probably what people know best as a high-order categorized view of the world, and those cataloging systems contain all kinds of odd mappings between the categories and the world they describe. 

Here’s the first top-level category in the Soviet library system: 

A: Marxism-Leninism
A1: Classic works of Marxism-Leninism
A3: Life and work of C.Marx, F.Engels, V.I.Lenin
A5: Marxism-Leninism Philosophy
A6: Marxist-Leninist Political Economics
A7/8: Scientific Communism

Some of those categories are starting to look a little bit dated. 

Or, my favorite — this is the Dewey Decimal System’s categorization for religions of the world, which is the 200 category. 

Dewey, 200: Religion
210 Natural theology
220 Bible
230 Christian theology
240 Christian moral & devotional theology
250 Christian orders & local church
260 Christian social theology
270 Christian church history
280 Christian sects & denominations
290 Other religions

How much is this not the categorization you want in the 21st century?

This kind of bias is rife in categorization systems. Here’s the Library of Congress’ categorization of History. These are all the top-level categories — all of these things are presented as being co-equal. 

D: History (general)
DA: Great Britain
DB: Austria
DC: France
DD: Germany
DE: Mediterranea
DF: Greece
DG: Italy
DH: Low Countries
DJ: Netherlands
DK: Former Soviet Union
DL: Scandinavia
DP: Iberian Peninsula
DQ: Switzerland
DR: Balkan Peninsula
DS: Asia
DT: Africa
DU: Oceania
DX: Gypsies

I’d like to call your attention to the ones in bold: The Balkan Peninsula. Asia. Africa. 

And just, you know, to review the geography:

World Map, with Africa and Asia circled
Spot the Difference?

Yet, for all the oddity of placing the Balkan Peninsula and Asia in the same level, this is harder to laugh off than the Dewey example, because it’s so puzzling. The Library of Congress — no slouches in the thinking department, founded by Thomas Jefferson — has a staff of people who do nothing but think about categorization all day long. So what’s being optimized here? It’s not geography. It’s not population. It’s not regional GDP.

What’s being optimized is number of books on the shelf. That’s what the categorization scheme is categorizing. It’s tempting to think that the classification schemes that libraries have optimized for in the past can be extended in an uncomplicated way into the digital world. This badly underestimates, in my view, the degree to which what libraries have historically been managing is an entirely different problem. 

The musculature of the Library of Congress categorization scheme looks like it’s about concepts. It is organized into non-overlapping categories that get more detailed at lower and lower levels — any concept is supposed to fit in one category and in no other categories. But every now and again, the skeleton pokes through, and the skeleton, the supporting structure around which the system is really built, is designed to minimize seek time on shelves.

The essence of a book isn’t the ideas it contains. The essence of a book is “book.” Thinking that library catalogs exist to organize concepts confuses the container for the thing contained.

The categorization scheme is a response to physical constraints on storage, and to people’s inability to keep the location of more than a few hundred things in their mind at once. Once you own more than a few hundred books, you have to organize them somehow. (My mother, who was a reference librarian, said she wanted to reshelve the entire University library by color, because students would come in and say “I’m looking for a sociology book. It’s green…”) But however you do it, the frailty of human memory and the physical fact of books make some sort of organizational scheme a requirement, and hierarchy is a good way to manage physical objects.

The “Balkans/Asia” kind of imbalance is simply a byproduct of physical constraints. It isn’t the ideas in a book that have to be in one place — a book can be about several things at once. It is the book itself, the physical fact of the bound object, that has to be one place, and if it’s one place, it can’t also be in another place. And this in turn means that a book has to be declared to be about some main thing. A book which is equally about two things breaks the ‘be in one place’ requirement, so each book needs to be declared to about one thing more than others, regardless of its actual contents.

People have been freaking out about the virtuality of data for decades, and you’d think we’d have internalized the obvious truth: there is no shelf. In the digital world, there is no physical constraint that’s forcing this kind of organization on us any longer. We can do without it, and you’d think we’d have learned that lesson by now.

And yet.

The Parable of the Ontologist, or, “There Is No Shelf” #

A little over ten years ago, a couple of guys out of Stanford launched a service called Yahoo that offered a list of things available on the Web. It was the first really significant attempt to bring order to the Web. As the Web expanded, the Yahoo list grew into a hierarchy with categories. As the Web expanded more they realized that, to maintain the value in the directory, they were going to have to systematize, so they hired a professional ontologist, and they developed their now-familiar top-level categories, which go to subcategories, each subcategory contains links to still other subcategories, and so on. Now we have this ontologically managed list of what’s out there.

Here we are in one of Yahoo’s top-level categories, Entertainment.

Yahoo's Entertainment Category
Yahoo’s Entertainment Category

You can see what the sub-categories of Entertainment are, whether or not there are new additions, and how many links roll up under those sub-categories. Except, in the case of Books and Literature, that sub-category doesn’t tell you how many links roll up under it. Books and Literature doesn’t end with a number of links, but with an “@” sign. That “@” sign is telling you that the category of Books and Literature isn’t ‘really’ in the category Entertainment. Yahoo is saying “We’ve put this link here for your convenience, but that’s only to take you to where Books and Literature ‘really’ are.” To which one can only respond — “What’s real?”

Yahoo is saying “We understand better than you how the world is organized, because we are trained professionals. So if you mistakenly think that Books and Literature are entertainment, we’ll put a little flag up so we can set you right, but to see those links, you have to ‘go’ to where they ‘are’.” (My fingers are going to fall off from all the air quotes.) When you go to Literature — which is part of Humanities, not Entertainment — you are told, similarly, that booksellers are not ‘really’ there. Because they are a commercial service, booksellers are ‘really’ in Business.

 'Literature' on Yahoo
‘Literature’ on Yahoo

Look what’s happened here. Yahoo, faced with the possibility that they could organize things with no physical constraints, added the shelf back. They couldn’t imagine organization without the constraints of the shelf, so they added it back. It is perfectly possible for any number of links to be in any number of places in a hierarchy, or in many hierarchies, or in no hierarchy at all. But Yahoo decided to privilege one way of organizing links over all others, because they wanted to make assertions about what is “real.” 

The charitable explanation for this is that they thought of this kind of a priori organization as their job, and as something their users would value. The uncharitable explanation is that they thought there was business value in determining the view the user would have to adopt to use the system. Both of those explanations may have been true at different times and in different measures, but the effect was to override the users’ sense of where things ought to be, and to insist on the Yahoo view instead.

File Systems and Hierarchy #

It’s easy to see how the Yahoo hierarchy maps to technological constraints as well as physical ones. The constraints in the Yahoo directory describes both a library categorization scheme and, obviously, a file system — the file system is both a powerful tool and a powerful metaphor, and we’re all so used to it, it seems natural.

Hierarchy
Hierarchy

There’s a top level, and subdirectories roll up under that. Subdirectories contain files or further subdirectories and so on, all the way down. Both librarians and computer scientists hit the same next idea, which is “You know, it wouldn’t hurt to add a few secondary links in here” — symbolic links, aliases, shortcuts, whatever you want to call them.

Hierarchy, Plus Links
Plus Links

The Library of Congress has something similar in its second-order categorization — “This book is mainly about the Balkans, but it’s also about art, or it’s mainly about art, but it’s also about the Balkans.” Most hierarchical attempts to subdivide the world use some system like this.

Then, in the early 90s, one of the things that Berners-Lee showed us is that you could have a lot of links. You don’t have to have just a few links, you could have a whole lot of links.

Plus Lots of Links
Plus Lots of Links

This is where Yahoo got off the boat. They said, “Get out of here with that crazy talk. A URL can only appear in three places. That’s the Yahoo rule.” They did that in part because they didn’t want to get spammed, since they were doing a commercial directory, so they put an upper limit on the number of symbolic links that could go into their view of the world. They missed the end of this progression, which is that, if you’ve got enough links, you don’t need the hierarchy anymore. There is no shelf. There is no file system. The links alone are enough.

Just Links (There Is No Filesystem)
Just Links (There Is No Filesystem)

One reason Google was adopted so quickly when it came along is that Google understood there is no shelf, and that there is no file system. Google can decide what goes with what after hearing from the user, rather than trying to predict in advance what it is you need to know. 

Let’s say I need every Web page with the word “obstreperous” and “Minnesota” in it. You can’t ask a cataloguer in advance to say “Well, that’s going to be a useful category, we should encode that in advance.” Instead, what the cataloguer is going to say is, “Obstreperous plus Minnesota! Forget it, we’re not going to optimize for one-offs like that.” Google, on the other hand, says, “Who cares? We’re not going to tell the user what to do, because the link structure is more complex than we can read, except in response to a user query.”

Browse versus search is a radical increase in the trust we put in link infrastructure, and in the degree of power derived from that link structure. Browse says the people making the ontology, the people doing the categorization, have the responsibility to organize the world in advance. Given this requirement, the views of the catalogers necessarily override the user’s needs and the user’s view of the world. If you want something that hasn’t been categorized in the way you think about it, you’re out of luck.

The search paradigm says the reverse. It says nobody gets to tell you in advance what it is you need. Search says that, at the moment that you are looking for it, we will do our best to service it based on this link structure, because we believe we can build a world where we don’t need the hierarchy to coexist with the link structure.

A lot of the conversation that’s going on now about categorization starts at a second step — “Since categorization is a good way to organize the world, we should…” But the first step is to ask the critical question: Is categorization a good idea? We can see, from the Yahoo versus Google example, that there are a number of cases where you get significant value out of notcategorizing. Even Google adopted DMOZ, the open source version of the Yahoo directory, and later they downgraded its presence on the site, because almost no one was using it. When people were offered search and categorization side-by-side, fewer and fewer people were using categorization to find things.

When Does Ontological Classification Work Well? #

Ontological classification works well in some places, of course. You need a card catalog if you are managing a physical library. You need a hierarchy to manage a file system. So what you want to know, when thinking about how to organize anything, is whether that kind of classification is a good strategy.

Here is a partial list of characteristics that help make it work:

Domain to be Organized

  • Small corpus
  • Formal categories
  • Stable entities
  • Restricted entities
  • Clear edges 

This is all the domain-specific stuff that you would like to be true if you’re trying to classify cleanly. The periodic table of the elements has all of these things — there are only a hundred or so elements; the categories are simple and derivable; protons don’t change because of political circumstances; only elements can be classified, not molecules; there are no blended elements; and so on. The more of those characteristics that are true, the better a fit ontology is likely to be.

The other key question, besides the characteristics of the domain itself, is “What are the participants like?” Here are some things that, if true, help make ontology a workable classification strategy:

Participants

  • Expert catalogers
  • Authoritative source of judgment
  • Coordinated users
  • Expert users

DSM-IV, the 4th version of the psychiatrists’ Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, is a classic example of an classification scheme that works because of these characteristics. DSM IV allows psychiatrists all over the US, in theory, to make the same judgment about a mental illness, when presented with the same list of symptoms. There is an authoritative source for DSM-IV, the American Psychiatric Association. The APA gets to say what symptoms add up to psychosis. They have both expert cataloguers and expert users. The amount of ‘people infrastructure’ that’s hidden in a working system like DSM IV is a big part of what makes this sort of categorization work.

This ‘people infrastructure’ is very expensive, though. One of the problem users have with categories is that when we do head-to-head tests — we describe something and then we ask users to guess how we described it — there’s a very poor match. Users have a terrifically hard time guessing how something they want will have been categorized in advance, unless they have been educated about those categories in advance as well, and the bigger the user base, the more work that user education is.

You can also turn that list around. You can say “Here are some characteristics where ontological classification doesn’t work well”: 

Domain

  • Large corpus
  • No formal categories
  • Unstable entities
  • Unrestricted entities
  • No clear edges

Participants

  • Uncoordinated users
  • Amateur users
  • Naive catalogers
  • No Authority

If you’ve got a large, ill-defined corpus, if you’ve got naive users, if your cataloguers aren’t expert, if there’s no one to say authoritatively what’s going on, then ontology is going to be a bad strategy.

The list of factors making ontology a bad fit is, also, an almost perfect description of the Web — largest corpus, most naive users, no global authority, and so on. The more you push in the direction of scale, spread, fluidity, flexibility, the harder it becomes to handle the expense of starting a cataloguing system and the hassle of maintaining it, to say nothing of the amount of force you have to get to exert over users to get them to drop their own world view in favor of yours.

The reason we know SUVs are a light truck instead of a car is that the Government says they’re a light truck. This is voodoo categorization, where acting on the model changes the world — when the Government says an SUV is a truck, it is a truck, by definition. Much of the appeal of categorization comes from this sort of voodoo, where the people doing the categorizing believe, even if only unconciously, that naming the world changes it. Unfortunately, most of the world is not actually amenable to voodoo categorization.

The reason we don’t know whether or not Buffy, The Vampire Slayer is science fiction, for example, is because there’s no one who can say definitively yes or no. In environments where there’s no authority and no force that can be applied to the user, it’s very difficult to support the voodoo style of organization. Merely naming the world creates no actual change, either in the world, or in the minds of potential users who don’t understand the system.

Mind Reading #

One of the biggest problems with categorizing things in advance is that it forces the categorizers to take on two jobs that have historically been quite hard: mind reading, and fortune telling. It forces categorizers to guess what their users are thinking, and to make predictions about the future. 

The mind-reading aspect shows up in conversations about controlled vocabularies. Whenever users are allowed to label or tag things, someone always says “Hey, I know! Let’s make a thesaurus, so that if you tag something ‘Mac’ and I tag it ‘Apple’ and somebody else tags it ‘OSX’, we all end up looking at the same thing!” They point to the signal loss from the fact that users, although they use these three different labels, are talking about the same thing.

The assumption is that we both can and should read people’s minds, that we can understand what they meant when they used a particular label, and, understanding that, we can start to restrict those labels, or at least map them easily onto one another.

This looks relatively simple with the Apple/Mac/OSX example, but when we start to expand to other groups of related words, like movies, film, and cinema, the case for the thesaurus becomes much less clear. I learned this from Brad Fitzpatrick’s design for LiveJournal, which allows user to list their own interests. LiveJournal makes absolutely no attempt to enforce solidarity or a thesaurus or a minimal set of terms, no check-box, no drop-box, just free-text typing. Some people say they’re interested in movies. Some people say they’re interested in film. Some people say they’re interested in cinema.

The cataloguers first reaction to that is, “Oh my god, that means you won’t be introducing the movies people to the cinema people!” To which the obvious answer is “Good. The movie people don’t want to hang out with the cinema people.” Those terms actually encode different things, and the assertion that restricting vocabularies improves signal assumes that that there’s no signal in the difference itself, and no value in protecting the user from too many matches.

When we get to really contested terms like queer/gay/homosexual, by this point, all the signal loss is in the collapse, not in the expansion. “Oh, the people talking about ‘queer politics’ and the people talking about ‘the homosexual agenda’, they’re really talking about the same thing.” Oh no they’re not. If you think the movies and cinema people were going to have a fight, wait til you get the queer politics and homosexual agenda people in the same room.

You can’t do it. You can’t collapse these categorizations without some signal loss. The problem is, because the cataloguers assume their classification should have force on the world, they underestimate the difficulty of understanding what users are thinking, and they overestimate the amount to which users will agree, either with one another or with the catalogers, about the best way to categorize. They also underestimate the loss from erasing difference of expression, and they overestimate loss from the lack of a thesaurus.

Fortune Telling #

The other big problem is that predicting the future turns out to be hard, and yet any classification system meant to be stable over time puts the categorizer in the position of fortune teller. 

Alert readers will be able to spot the difference between Sentence A and Sentence B.

A: "I love you."
B: "I will always love you."

Woe betide the person who utters Sentence B when what they mean is Sentence A. Sentence A is a statement. Sentence B is a prediction.

But this is the ontological dilemma. Consider the following statements:

A: "This is a book about Dresden."
B: "This is a book about Dresden,
and it goes in the category 'East Germany'."

That second sentence seems so obvious, but East Germany actually turned out to be an unstable category. Cities are real. They are real, physical facts. Countries are social fictions. It is much easier for a country to disappear than for a city to disappear, so when you’re saying that the small thing is contained by the large thing, you’re actually mixing radically different kinds of entities. We pretend that ‘country’ refers to a physical area the same way ‘city’ does, but it’s not true, as we know from places like the former Yugoslavia.

There is a top-level category, you may have seen it earlier in the Library of Congress scheme, called Former Soviet Union. The best they were able to do was just tack “former” onto that entire zone that they’d previously categorized as the Soviet Union. Not because that’s what they thought was true about the world, but because they don’t have the staff to reshelve all the books. That’s the constraint.

Part II: The Only Group That Can Categorize Everything Is Everybody #

When we reexamine categorization without assuming the physical constraint either of hierarchy on disk or of hierarchy in the physical world, we get very different answers. Let’s say you wanted to merge two libraries — mine and the Library of Congress’s. (You can tell it’s the Library of Congress on the right, because they have a few more books than I do.)

Two Categorized Collections of Books
Two Categorized Collections of Books

So, how do we do this? Do I have to sit down with the Librarian of Congress and say, “Well, in my world, Python In A Nutshell is a reference work, and I keep all of my books on creativity together.” Do we have to hash out the difference between my categorization scheme and theirs before the Library of Congress is able to take my books?

No, of course we don’t have to do anything of the sort. They’re able to take my books in while ignoring my categories, because all my books have ISBN numbers, International Standard Book Numbers. They’re not merging at the category level. They’re merging at the globally unique item level. My entities, my uniquely labeled books, go into Library of Congress scheme trivially. The presence of unique labels means that merging libraries doesn’t require merging categorization schemes.

Merge ISBNs
Merge ISBNs

Now imagine a world where everything can have a unique identifier. This should be easy, since that’s the world we currently live in — the URL gives us a way to create a globally unique ID for anything we need to point to. Sometimes the pointers are direct, as when a URL points to the contents of a Web page. Sometimes they are indirect, as when you use an Amazon link to point to a book. Sometimes there are layers of indirection, as when you use a URI, a uniform resource identifier, to name something whose location is indeterminate. But the basic scheme gives us ways to create a globally unique identifier for anything. 

And once you can do that, anyone can label those pointers, can tag those URLs, in ways that make them more valuable, and all without requiring top-down organization schemes. And this — an explosion in free-form labeling of links, followed by all sorts of ways of grabbing value from those labels — is what I think is happening now. 

Great Minds Don’t Think Alike #

Here is del.icio.us, Joshua Shachter’s social bookmarking service. It’s for people who are keeping track of their URLs for themselves, but who are willing to share globally a view of what they’re doing, creating an aggregate view of all users’ bookmarks, as well as a personal view for each user.

Front Page of del.icio.us
Front Page of del.icio.us

As you can see here, the characteristics of a del.icio.us entry are a link, an optional extended description, and a set of tags, which are words or phrases users attach to a link. Each user who adds a link to the system can give it a set of tags — some do, some don’t. Attached to each link on the home page are the tags, the username of the person who added it, the number of other people who have added that same link, and the time.

Tags are simply labels for URLs, selected to help the user in later retrieval of those URLs. Tags have the additional effect of grouping related URLs together. There is no fixed set of categories or officially approved choices. You can use words, acronyms, numbers, whatever makes sense to you, without regard for anyone else’s needs, interests, or requirements.

The addition of a few simple labels hardly seems so momentous, but the surprise here, as so often with the Web, is the surprise of simplicity. Tags are important mainly for what they leave out. By forgoing formal classification, tags enable a huge amount of user-produced organizational value, at vanishingly small cost.

There’s a useful comparison here between gopher and the Web, where gopher was better organized, better mapped to existing institutional practices, and utterly unfit to work at internet scale. The Web, by contrast, was and is a complete mess, with only one brand of pointer, the URL, and no mechanism for global organization or resources. The Web is mainly notable for two things — the way it ignored most of the theories of hypertext and rich metadata, and how much better it works than any of the proposed alternatives. (The Yahoo/Google strategies I mentioned earlier also split along those lines.)

With those changes afoot, here are some of the things that I think are coming, as advantages of tagging systems:

  • Market Logic – As we get used to the lack of physical constraints, as we internalize the fact that there is no shelf and there is no disk, we’re moving towards market logic, where you deal with individual motivation, but group value.
    As Schachter says of del.icio.us, “Each individual categorization scheme is worth less than a professional categorization scheme. But there are many, many more of them.” If you find a way to make it valuable to individuals to tag their stuff, you’ll generate a lot more data about any given object than if you pay a professional to tag it once and only once. And if you can find any way to create value from combining myriad amateur classifications over time, they will come to be more valuable than professional categorization schemes, particularly with regards to robustness and cost of creation.
    The other essential value of market logic is that individual differences don’t have to be homogenized. Look for the word ‘queer’ in almost any top-level categorization. You will not find it, even though, as an organizing principle for a large group of people, that word matters enormously. Users don’t get to participate those kind of discussions around traditional categorization schemes, but with tagging, anyone is free to use the words he or she thinks are appropriate, without having to agree with anyone else about how something “should” be tagged. Market logic allows many distinct points of view to co-exist, because it allows individuals to preserve their point of view, even in the face of general disagreement.
  • User and Time are Core Attributes – This is absolutely essential. The attitude of the Yahoo ontologist and her staff was — “We are Yahoo We do not have biases. This is just how the world is. The world is organized into a dozen categories.” You don’t know who those people were, where they came from, what their background was, what their political biases might be.
    Here, because you can derive ‘this is who this link is was tagged by’ and ‘this is when it was tagged, you can start to do inclusion and exclusion around people and time, not just tags. You can start to do grouping. You can start to do decay. “Roll up tags from just this group of users, I’d like to see what they are talking about” or “Give me all tags with this signature, but anything that’s more than a week old or a year old.”
    This is group tagging — not the entire population, and not just me. It’s like Unix permissions — right now we’ve got tags for user and world, and this is the base on which we will be inventing group tags. We’re going to start to be able to subset our categorization schemes. Instead of having massive categorizations and then specialty categorization, we’re going to have a spectrum between them, based on the size and make-up of various tagging groups.
  • Signal Loss from Expression – The signal loss in traditional categorization schemes comes from compressing things into a restricted number of categories. With tagging, when there is signal loss, it comes from people not having any commonality in talking about things. The loss is from the multiplicity of points of view, rather than from compression around a single point of view. But in a world where enough points of view are likely to provide some commonality, the aggregate signal loss falls with scale in tagging systems, while it grows with scale in systems with single points of view.
    The solution to this sort of signal loss is growth. Well-managed, well-groomed organizational schemes get worse with scale, both because the costs of supporting such schemes at large volumes are prohibitive, and, as I noted earlier, scaling over time is also a serious problem. Tagging, by contrast, gets better with scale. With a multiplicity of points of view the question isn’t “Is everyone tagging any given link ‘correctly'”, but rather “Is anyone tagging it the way I do?” As long as at least one other person tags something they way you would, you’ll find it — using a thesaurus to force everyone’s tags into tighter synchrony would actually worsen the noise you’ll get with your signal. If there is no shelf, then even imagining that there is one right way to organize things is an error. 
  • The Filtering is Done Post Hoc – There’s an analogy here with every journalist who has ever looked at the Web and said “Well, it needs an editor.” The Web has an editor, it’s everybody. In a world where publishing is expensive, the act of publishing is also a statement of quality — the filter comes before the publication. In a world where publishing is cheap, putting something out there says nothing about its quality. It’s what happens after it gets published that matters. If people don’t point to it, other people won’t read it. But the idea that the filtering is after the publishing is incredibly foreign to journalists.
    Similarly, the idea that the categorization is done after things are tagged is incredibly foreign to cataloguers. Much of the expense of existing catalogue systems is in trying to prevent one-off categories. With tagging, what you say is “As long as a lot of people are tagging any given link, the rare tags can be used or ignored, as the user likes. We won’t even have to expend the cost to prevent people from using them. We’ll just help other users ignore them if they want to.” 
    Again, scale comes to the rescue of the system in a way that would simply break traditional cataloging schemes. The existence of an odd or unusual tag is a problem if it’s the only way a given link has been tagged, or if there is no way for a user to avoid that tag. Once a link has been tagged more than once, though, users can view or ignore the odd tags as it suits them, and the decision about which tags to use comes after the links have been tagged, not before.
  • Merged from URLs, Not Categories – You don’t merge tagging schemes at the category level and then see what the contents are. As with the ‘merging ISBNs’ idea, you merge individual contents, because we now have URLs as unique handles. You merge from the URLs, and then try and derive something about the categorization from there. This allows for partial, incomplete, or probabilistic merges that are better fits to uncertain environments — such as the real world — than rigid classification schemes.
  • Merges are Probabilistic, not Binary – Merges create partial overlap between tags, rather than defining tags as synonyms. Instead of saying that any given tag “is” or “is not” the same as another tag, del.icio.us is able to recommend related tags by saying “A lot of people who tagged this ‘Mac’ also tagged it ‘OSX’.” We move from a binary choice between saying two tags are the same or different to the Venn diagram option of “kind of is/somewhat is/sort of is/overlaps to this degree”. That is a really profound change.

Nomic World: By the players, for the players

First published May 27, 2004 on the “Networks, Economics, and Culture” mailing list.

[This is an edited version of the talk I gave last fall at the State of Play conference.]

I’m sort of odd-man-out in a Games and Law conference, in that my primary area of inquiry isn’t games but social software. Not only am I not a lawyer, I don’t even spend most of my time thinking about game problems. I spend my time thinking about software that supports group interaction across a fairly wide range of social patterns. 

So, instead of working from case law out, which has been a theme here (and here’s where I insert the “I am not a lawyer” disclaimer) I’m going to propose a thought experiment looking from the outside in. And I want to pick up on something that Julian [Dibbell] said earlier about game worlds: ‘users are the state.’ The thought experiment I want to propose is to agree with that sentiment, and to ask “How far can we go in that direction?”

Instead of looking for the places where game users are currently suing or fighting one another, forcing the owners of various virtual worlds to deal with these things one crisis at a time, I want to ask the question “What would happen if we wanted to build a world where we maximized the amount of user control? What would that look like?”

I’m going to make that argument in three pieces. First, I’m going to do a little background on group structure and the tension between the individual and the group. Then I want to contrast briefly governance in real and virtual worlds. Finally I want to propose a thought experiment on placing control of online spaces in the hands of the users.

Background [This material is also covered in A Group Is Its Own Worst Enemy — ed.]

The background first: The core fact about human groups is that they are first-class entities. They exhibit behaviors that can’t be predicted by looking at individual psychologies. When groups of people get together they do surprising things, things you can’t predict from watching the behavior of individuals. I want to illustrate this with a story, and I want to illustrate it with a story from your life, because even though I don’t know you, I know what I’m about to describe has happened to you.

You’re at a party and you get bored — it’s not doing it for you anymore. The people you wanted to talk to have already left, you’ve been there a long time, you’d rather be home playing Ultima, whatever. You’re ready to go. And then a really remarkable thing happens – you don’t actually leave. You decide you don’t like this party anymore, but you don’t walk out. That second thing, that thing keeping you there is a kind of social stickiness. And so there’s this tension between your intellectual self and your membership, however tenuous, in the group. 

Then, twenty minutes later, another really remarkable thing happens. Somebody else gets their coat, ‘Oh, look at the time.’ What happens? Suddenly everybody is leaving all at once. So you have this group of people, each of whom is perfectly capable of making individual decisions and yet they’re unconsciously synchronizing in ways that you couldn’t have predicted from watching each of them. 

We’re very used to talking about social structure in online game spaces in terms of guilds or other formal organizations. But in fact, human group structure kicks in incredibly early, at very low levels of common association. Anything more focused than a group of people standing together in an elevator is likely to exhibit some of these group effects. 

So what’s it like to be there at that party, once you’ve decided to leave but are not leaving? It’s horrible. You really want to go and you’re stuck. And that tension is between your emotional commitment to the group fabric and your intellectual decision that this is not for you. The tension between the individual and the group is inevitable, it arises over and over again — we’ve seen that pattern for as long as we’ve had any history of human groups we can look at in any detail. 

Unfortunately the literature is pretty clear this isn’t a problem you outgrow. The tension between the individual and the group is a permanent fact of human life. And when groups get to the point where this tension becomes a crisis, they have to say “Some individual freedoms have to be curtailed in order for group cohesion to be protected.” 

This is an extremely painful moment, especially in communities that privilege individual freedoms, and the first crisis, of course, is the worst one. In the first crisis, not only do you have to change the rules, you don’t even have those rules spelt out in the first place — that’s the constitutional crisis. That’s the crisis where you say, this group of people is going to be self-governing.

Group structure, even when it’s not explicitly political, is in part a response to this tension. It’s a response to the idea that the cohesion of the group sometimes requires limits on individual rights. (As an aside, this is one of the reasons that libertarianism in its extreme form doesn’t work, because it assumes that groups are simply aggregates of individuals, and that those individuals will create shared value without any sort of coercion. In fact, the logic of collective action, to use Mancur Olsen’s phrase, requires some limits on individual freedom. Olsen’s book on the subject, by the way, is brilliant if a little dry.) 

Fork World

If you want to see why the tension between the individual and the group is so significant, imagine a world, call it Fork World, where the citizens were given the right to vote on how the world was run. In Fork World, however, the guiding principle would be “no coercion.” Players would vote on rule changes, but instead of announcing winners and losers at the end of a vote, the world would simply be split in two with every vote.

Imagine there was a vote in Fork World on whether players can kill one another, say, which has been a common theme in political crises in virtual worlds. After the vote, instead of imposing the results on everyone, you would send everyone who voted Yes to a world where player killing is allowed, and everyone who voted No to an alternate world, identical in every respect except that player killing was not allowed.

And of course, after 20 such votes, you would have subdivided 2 to the 20th times, leaving you with a million potential worlds — a world with player killing and where your possessions can be stolen when you die and where you re-spawn vs. a world with player killing and possession stealing but death is permanent, and so on. Even if you started with a million players on Day One, by your 20th vote each world would average, by definition, one player per world. You would have created a new category of MMO — the Minimally Multi-player Online game.

This would fulfill the libertarian fantasy of no coercion on behalf of the group, because no one would ever be asked to assent to rules they hadn’t voted for, but it would also be approximately no fun. To get the pleasure of other people’s company, people have to abide by rules they might not like considered in isolation. Group cohesion has significant value, value that makes accepting majority rule worthwhile.

Simple Governance Stack

Since tensions between group structure and individual behavior are fundamental, we can look at ways that real world group structure and virtual world group structure differ. To illustrate this, I’m going to define the world’s tiniest stack, a three-layer stack of governance functions in social spaces. This is of course a tremendous over-simplification, you could draw the stack at all kinds of levels of complexity. I’ve used three levels because it’s what fits on a Powerpoint slide with great big text.

– Social Norms
– Interventions
– Mechanics

At the top level are social norms. We’ve heard this several times at the conference today — social norms in game worlds have the effect of governance. There are some societies where not wearing white shoes after Memorial Day has acquired the force of law. It’s nowhere spelt out, no one can react to you in any kind of official way if you violate that rule, and yet there’s a social structure that keeps that in place.

Then at the bottom of the stack is mechanics, the stuff that just happens. I’ve pulled Norman Mailer’s quote about Naked Lunch here — “As implacable as a sales tax.” Sales tax just happens as a side-effect of living our normal lives. We have all sorts of mechanisms for making it work in this way, but the experience of the average citizen is that the tax just happens. 

And between these top and bottom layers in the stack, between relatively light-weight social norms and things that are really embedded into the mechanics of society, are lots and lots of interventions, places where we give some segment of society heightened power, and then allow them to make judgment calls, albeit with oversight.

Arresting someone or suing someone are examples of such interventions, where human judgment is required. I’ve listed interventions in the middle of the stack because they are more than socially enforceable — suing someone for libel is more than just social stigma– but they are not mechanical — libel is a judgment call, so some human agency is required to decide whether libel has happened, and if so, how it should be dealt with.

And of course these layers interact with one another as well. One of the characteristics of this interaction is that in many cases social norms acquire the force of law. If the society can be shown to have done things in a certain way consistently and for a long time, the courts will, at least in common law societies, abide by that. 

The Stack in Social Worlds

Contrast the virtual world. Social norms – the players have all sorts of ways of acting on and enacting social norms. There are individual behaviors – trolling and flaming, which are in part indoctrination rituals and in part population control, then there are guilds and more organized social structures, so there’s a spectrum of formality in the social controls in the game world. 

Beneath that there’s intervention by wizardly fiat. Intervention comes from the people who have a higher order of power, some sort of direct access to the software that runs the system. Sometimes it is used to solve social dilemmas, like the toading of Mr. Bungle in LambdaMoo, or for dispute resolution, where two players come to a deadlock, and it can’t be worked out except by a third party who has more power. Sometimes it’s used to fix places where system mechanics break down, as with the story from Habitat about accidentally allowing a player to get a too-powerful gun.

Intervention is a key lubricator, since it allows the ad hoc solution of unforeseen problems, and the history of both political norms and computer networks is the history of unforeseen problems.

And then there’s mechanics. The principal difference between real world mechanics and virtual world mechanics is ownership. Someone owns the server – there is a deed for a box sitting in a hosting company somewhere, and that server could be turned off by the person who owns it. The irony is that although we’re used to computers greatly expanding the reach of the individual, as they do in many aspects of our lives, in this domain they actually contract it. Players live in an online analog to a shopping mall, which seems like public space, but is actually privately owned. And of course both the possibility of monitoring and control in virtual worlds is orders of magnitude higher than in a shopping mall.

The players have no right to modification of the game world, or even to oversight of the world’s owners. There are very few environments where the players can actually vote to compel either the system administrators or the owners to do things, in a way that acquires the force of law. (Michael Froomkin has done some interesting work on testing legal structures in game worlds.)

In fact what often happens, both online and off, is that structures are created which look like citizen input, but these structures are actually designed to deflect participation while providing political cover. Anyone in academia knows that faculty meetings exist so the administration can say “Well you were consulted” whenever something bad happens, even though the actual leverage the faculty has over the ultimate decision is nil. The model here is customer service — generate a feeling of satisfaction at the lowest possible cost. Political representation, on the other hand, is a high-cost exercise, not least because it requires group approval.

Two Obstacles

So, what are the barriers to self-governance by the users? There are two big ones — lots of little ones, but two big ones. 

The first obstacle is code, the behavior of code. As Lessig says, code is law. In online spaces, code defines the environment we operate in. It’s difficult to share the powers of code among the users, because our current hardware design center is the ‘Personal Computer’, we don’t have a design that’s allows for social constraints on individual use.

Wizards have a higher degree of power than other players, and simply allowing everyone to be a wizard tends to very quickly devolve into constant fighting about what to do with those wizardly powers. (We’ve seen this with IRC [internet relay chat], where channel operators have higher powers than mere users, leading to operator wars, where the battle is over control of the space.)

The second big obstacle is economics — the box that runs the virtual world is owned by someone, and it isn’t you. When you pay your $20 a month to Sony or Microsoft, you’re subscribing to a service, but you’re not actually paying for the server directly. The ownership passes through a series of layers that dilutes your control over it. The way our legal system works, it’s hard for groups to own things without being legal entities. It’s easy for Sony to own infrastructure, but for you and your 5 friends to own a server in common, you’d have to create some kind of formal entity. IOUs and social agreements to split the cost won’t get you very far. 

So, if we want to maximize player control, if we want to create an environment in which users have refined control, political control, over this stack I’ve drawn, you have to deal with those two obstacles — making code subject to political control, and making it possible for the group to own their own environment.

Nomic World

Now what would it be like if we set out to design a game environment like that? Instead of just waiting for the players to argue for property rights or democratic involvement, what would it be like to design an environment where they owned their online environment directly, where we took the “Code is Law” equation at face value, and gave the users a constitution that included the ability to both own and alter the environment?

There’s a curious tension here between political representation and games. The essence of political representation is that the rules are subject to oversight and alteration by the very people expected to abide by them, while games are fun in part because the rule set is fixed. Even in games with highly idiosyncratic adjustments to the rules, as with Monopoly say, the particular rules are fixed in advance of playing.

One possible approach to this problem is to make changing the rules fun, to make it part of the game. This is exactly the design center of a game called Nomic. It was invented in 1982 by the philosopher Peter Suber. He included it as an appendix to a book called The Paradox of Self Amendment, which concerns the philosophical ramifications of having a body of laws that includes the instructions for modifying those laws.

Nomic is a game in which changing the rules is a legitimate move within the game world, which makes it closer to the condition of a real government than to, say, Everquest. The characteristics of the Nomic rules are, I think, the kind of thing you would have to take on if you wanted to build an environment in which players had real control. Nomic rules are alterable, and they’re also explicit – one of the really interesting things about designing a game in which changing the rules is one of the rules, is you have to say much more carefully what the rules actually are. 

The first rule of Nomic, Rule 101, is “All players must abide by the rules.” Now that’s an implicit rule that almost any game anyone ever plays, but in Nomic it needs to be spelled out, and ironically, once you spell it out it’s up for amendment – you can have a game of Nomic in which you allow people to no longer play by the rules.

Suber’s other key intuition, I think, in addition to making mutability a move in the game, is making Nomic contain both deep and shallow rules. There are rules that are “immutable”, and rules that are mutable. I put immutable in quotes because Rule 103 allows for “…the transmutation of an immutable rule into a mutable rule or vice versa.”

Because the players can first vote to make an immutable rule mutable, and then can vote to change the newly mutable rule, Nomic works a little like the US Constitution: there are things that are easier to change and harder to change, but nothing is beyond change. For example, flag burning is currently protected speech under our First Amendment, so laws restricting flag burning are invariably struck down as unconstitutional. An amendment to the constitution making flag burning illegal, however, would not, by definition, be unconstitutional, but such an amendment is much much harder to pass than an ordinary law. Same pattern.

The game Nomic has the advantage of being mental and interpretive, unlike software-mediated environments, where the rules are blindly run by the processor. We know (thank you Herr Godel), that we cannot prove that any sufficiently large set of rules is also self-consistent, and we know (from bitter experience) that even simple software contains bugs. 

The task of instantiating a set of rules in code and then trying to work in the resulting environment, while modifying it, can seem daunting. I think it’s worth trying, though, because an increasing degree of our lives, personal, social and political, are going to be lived in these mediated spaces. The importance of online spaces as public gatherings is so fundamental, in fact, that for the rest of this talk, I’m going to use the words player and citizen interchangeably.

How to build it?

How to build a Nomic world? Start with economics. The current barriers to self-ownership by users is simple: the hardware running the social environment is owned by someone, and we have a model of contractual obligation for ownership of hardware, rather than a model of political membership. 

One possible response to current economic barriers, call it the Co-operative Model, is to use contracts to create political rights. Here we would set up a world or game in which the people running it are actually the employees of the citizens, not the employees of the game company, and their relationship to the body of citizens is effectively as work-for-hire. This would be different than the current ‘monthly subscriber’ model for most game worlds. In the co-operative model, when you’re paying for access to the game world your dollars would buy you shares of stock in a joint stock corporation — citizens would be both stakeholders and shareholders. There would be a fiduciary duty on the part of the people running the game on your behalf to act on the political will of the people, however expressed, rather than the contractual relationship we have now. 

The downside of this model is that the contractual requirements to do such a thing are complex. The Open Source world gives us a number of interesting models for valuable communal property like the license to a particular piece of software being held in trust. When such a communal trust, though, wants to have employees, the contracts become far more complex, and the citizens’ co-op becomes an employer. Not un-do-able, but not a great target for quick experiments either.

A second way to allow a group to own their own social substrate is with a Distributed Model, where you would attack the problem down at the level of the infrastructure. If the issue is that any one server has to be owned somewhere, distribute the server. Run the environment on individual PC’s and create a peer-to-peer network, so that the entirety of the infrastructure is literally owned by the citizens from the moment they join the game. That pushes some technological constraints, like asynchronicity, into the environment, but it’s also a way of attacking ownership, and one that doesn’t require a lot of contractual specification with employees. 

[Since I gave this talk, I’ve discovered BlogNomic, a version of Nomic run on weblogs, which uses this “distributed platform” pattern.]

A third way could be called Cheap Model; simply work at such low cost that you can piggyback on low-cost or free infrastructure. If you wanted to build a game, this would probably mean working in text-based strategy mode, rather than the kind of immersive graphic worlds we’ve been talking so much about today. There are a number of social tools — wikis and mailing lists and so on — that are freely available and cheap to host. In this case, a one-time donation of a few dollars per citizen at the outset would cover hosting costs for some time.

Those are some moves that would potentially free a Nomic environment from the economic constraints of ownership by someone other than the citizens. The second constraint is dealing with the code, the actual software running the world. 

Code

Code is a much harder thing to manipulate than economics. Current barriers in code, as I said, are levels of permission and root powers. The real world has nothing like root access — there is an urban legend, a rural legend, I guess, about the State of Tennesee declaring the value of pi to be 3, as irrational numbers were decidedly inconvenient. However, the passage of such a law couldn’t actually change the value of pi. 

In an online world, on the other hand, it would be possible to redefine pi, or indeed any other value, which would in some cases cause the world itself to grind to a halt. 

This situation, where a rule change ends the game, is possible even in Nomic. In one game a few years ago, a set of players made a sub-game of trying to pass game-ending rules. Now in theory Nomic shouldn’t allow such a thing, since such rules could be repealed, so this group of players specifically targeted unrepealability as the core virtue of all their proposed changes. One such change, for example, would have made the comment period for subsequent rule changes 54 years long. Such a rule could eventually have been repealed, of course, but not in a year with two zeros in the middle.

So unlike actual political systems, where the legislators are allowed to create nonsensical but unenforceable laws, in virtual worlds, it’s possible to make laws that are nonsensical and enforceable, even at the expense of damaging the world itself. This means that any citizen-owned and operated environment would have to include a third set of controls, designed to safeguard the world itself against this kind of damage.

One potential response is to create Platform World, with a third, deeper level of immutability, enforced with the choice of platform. You could announce a social experiment, using anything from mailing list software to There.com, and that would set a bounded environment. You can imagine that software slowly mutating away from the original code base, as citizens made rule changes that required code changes, but by picking a root platform, you would actually have a set of rules embodied in code that was harder to change than classic Nomic rules. The top two layers of the stack, the social and interventionist changes, could happen in the environment, but re-coding the mechanics of the environment itself would be harder.

A second possibility, as a move completely away from that, would be Coder World. Here you would only allow users who are comfortable coding to play or participate in this environment, so that a kind of literacy becomes a requirement for participation. This would greatly narrow the range of potential participants, but would flatten the stack so that all citizens could participate directly in all layers. This flattening would lead to problems of its own of course, and would often devolve into tests of hacking prowess, and even attempts crash the world, as with Nomic, but that might be interesting in and of itself.

Third, and this is the closest to the current game world model, would be Macro World. Here you would create a bunch of macro-languages, to create ways in which end-users who aren’t coders could nevertheless alter the world they inhabit. And obviously object creation, the whole history of creating virtual objects for virtual environments, works this way now, but it’s not yet at the level of creating the environment itself from scratch. You come into an environment in which you create objects, rather than coming into a negative space and letting the citizens build up the environment, including the rules.

A fourth and final possibility is a CVS World. CVS is a concurrent versioning system, it’s what programmers use to keep code safe, so that when they make a change that breaks something, they can role back a version. Wikis, collaborative workspaces where users create the site together and on the fly, have shown that the CVS pattern can have important social uses as well.

In the Matrix tradition, because I guess that everybody’s referred to the Matrix in every talk today, CVS World would be a world in which you simply wouldn’t care if citizens made mistakes and screwed up the world, because the world could always be rolled back to the last working version. 

In this environment, the ‘crash the world’ problem stops being a problem not because there is a defense against crashing, but rather a response. If someone crashes the world, for whatever reason, it rolls back to the last working version. And that would be potentially the most dynamic in terms of experimentation, but it would also have probably the most disruption of game play.

Why do it?

The looming question here, of course, is “Would it be fun?” Would it be fun to be in a virtual environment where citizens have a significant amount of control, and where the legal structures reflect the legal structures we know in the real world?” And the answer is, maybe no. 

One of my great former students, Elizabeth Goodman, said, the reason academics like to talk about play but not about fun is that you can force people to play. Much of what makes a game fun is mastering the rules — both winning as defined by the rules and gaming the system are likely to be more fun than taking responsibility for what the rules are. There is a danger that by dumping so much responsibility into the citizen’s laps, we would end up re-creating all the fun of city planning board meetings in an online environment (though given players’ willingness to sit around all day making armor, maybe that’s not a fatal flaw.)

Despite all of this, though, I think it’s worth maximizing citizen involvement through experiments in ownership and control of code, for several reasons.

First, as Ted [Castronova]’s work shows, the economic seriousness of game worlds has surpassed anything any of us would have expected even a few years ago. Economics and politics are both about distributed optimization under constraints, and given the surprises we’ve seen in the economic sphere, with inflation in virtual worlds and economy hacking by players, it would be interesting to see if similar energy would be devoted to political engagement, on a level more fundamental than making and managing Guild rules.

Next, it’s happening anyway, so why not formalize it? As Julian [Dibbell]’s work on everything from LambdaMOO to MMO Terms of Service demonstrates, the demands for governance are universal features of virtual worlds, and rather than simply re-invent solutions one crisis at a time, we could start building a palette of viable political systems.

Finally, and this is the most important point, we are moving an increasing amount of our speech to owned environments. The economic seriousness of these worlds undermines the ‘it’s only a game’ argument, and the case of tk being run out of the Sims for publishing reports critical of the game show how quickly freedom of speech issues can arise. The real world is too difficult to control by fiat — pi remains stubbornly irrational no matter who votes on it — but the online world is not. Even in non-game and non-fee collecting social environments like Yahoo Groups, the intrusiveness of advertising and the right of the owners to unilaterally change the rules creates many fewer freedoms than we enjoy offline.

We should experiment with game-world models that dump a large and maybe even unpleasant amount of control into the hands of the players because it’s the best lab we have for experiments with real governance in the 21st century agora, the place where people gather when they want to be out in public. 

While real world political culture has the unfortunate effect of being either/or choices — uni-cameral or bi-cameral legislatures, president or prime minister, and so on — the online world offers us a degree of flexibility that allows us to model rather than theorize. Wonder what the difference is between forcing new citizens to have sponsors vs. dumping newbies into the world alone? Try it both ways and see how the results differ.

This is really the argument for Nomic World, for making an environment as wholly owned and managed by and for the citizens as a real country — if we’re going to preserve our political freedoms as we moved to virtual environments, we’re going to need novel political and economic relations between the citizens and their environments. We need this, we can’t get it from the real world. So we might as well start experimenting now, because it’s going to take a long time to get good at it, and if we can enlist the players efforts, we’ll learn more, much more, than if we leave the political questions in the hands of the owners and wizards.

And with that, I’ll sit down. Thanks very much.

Situated Software

First published March 30, 2004 on the “Networks, Economics, and Culture” mailing list. 

I teach at NYU’s Interactive Telecommunications Program (ITP), where the student population is about evenly divided between technologists who care about aesthetics and artists who aren’t afraid of machines, which makes it a pretty good place to see the future. 

Part of the future I believe I’m seeing is a change in the software ecosystem which, for the moment, I’m calling situated software. This is software designed in and for a particular social situation or context. This way of making software is in contrast with what I’ll call the Web School (the paradigm I learned to program in), where scalability, generality, and completeness were the key virtues.

I see my students cheerfully ignoring Web School practices and yet making interesting work, a fact that has given me persistent cognitive dissonance for a year, so I want to describe the pattern here, even in its nascent stages, to see if other people are seeing the same thing elsewhere.

Users By The Dozens

We’ve always had a tension between enterprise design practices and a “small pieces, loosely joined” way of making software, to use David Weinberger’s felicitous phrase. The advantages to the latter are in part described in Worse is Better and The Cathedral and the Bazaar. Situated software is in the small pieces category, with the following additional characteristic — it is designed for use by a specific social group, rather than for a generic set of “users”.

The biggest difference this creates relative to classic web applications is that it becomes easy to build applications to be used by dozens of users, an absurd target population in current design practice. Making form-fit software for a small group of users has typically been the province of banks and research labs — because of the costs involved, Web School applications have concentrated on getting large-scale audiences. And by privileging the value that comes with scale, Web School applications put other kinds of value, particularly social value, out of reach. 

We’ve been killing conversations about software with “That won’t scale” for so long we’ve forgotten that scaling problems aren’t inherently fatal. The N-squared problem is only a problem if N is large, and in social situations, N is usually not large. A reading group works better with 5 members than 15; a seminar works better with 15 than 25, much less 50, and so on.

This in turn gives software form-fit to a particular group a number of desirable characteristics — it’s cheaper and faster to build, has fewer issues of scalability, and likelier uptake by its target users. It also has several obvious downsides, including less likelihood of use outside its original environment, greater brittleness if it is later called on to handle larger groups, and a potentially shorter lifespan.

I see my students making some of these tradeoffs, though, because the kinds of scarcities the Web School was meant to address — the expense of adequate hardware, the rarity of programming talent, and the sparse distribution of potential users — are no longer the constraints they once were. 

Teachers on the Run

The first inkling I got that the Web School rationale might be weakening was an application written by two of my former students, Paul Berry and Keren Merimeh. In November of 2002, as a project for a class on the feeling of online spaces called Social Weather, they created an application called (alarmingly) Teachers on the Run.

Teachers on the Run was essentially HotorNot for ITP professors, to allow students to describe and rate us in advance of spring course registration. Every professor was listed in a database; students could come by anonymously and either enter a comment about a professor or cast a vote agreeing or disagreeing with an earlier comment. The descriptions were sorted in vote total order, so that a +5 description (5 more students had agreed than disagreed) was displayed higher than a +2 or a -3. And that was it — a list of names, a list of comments, click to vote, and a simple sorting algorithm.

They launched it on a Friday. By Saturday night, another student called me at home to tell me I’d better take a look at it. There are only 200 or so students at ITP, but Teachers on the Run had already accumulated hundreds of comments, most positive, some negative, a few potentially libelous. More importantly, though, there had been over a thousand votes in 24 hours. By Monday morning, I had students telling me they knew what was on the site, not because they’d seen it, but because it had been the only topic of conversation over the weekend. 

The curious thing to me about Teachers on the Run was that it worked where the Web School version failed. RateMyProfessors.com has been available for years, with a feature set that put the simplistic write/read/vote capabilities of Teachers on the Run to shame. Yet no one at ITP had ever bothered to use RateMyProfessors.com, though the weekend’s orgy of rating and voting demonstrated untapped demand.

Despite the social energy it unleashed, I missed the importance of Teachers on the Run. I told myself that it had succeeded for a number of reasons that were vaguely unfair: The users knew the programmers; the names database had been populated in advance; the programmers could use the in-house mailing list to launch the application rather than trying to get attention through press releases and banner ads. Most damning of all, it wouldn’t scale, the sine qua non of successful Web applications. DOA, QED.

Then I saw the design process my most recent class went through.

The Class

In a class called Social Software, which I taught last fall, the students worked in small groups to design and launch software to support some form of group interaction. To anchor the class, I required that whatever project they came up with be used by other ITP students. This first order benefits of this strategy were simple: the designers came from the same population as the users, and could thus treat their own instincts as valid; beta-testers could be recruited by walking down the hall; and it kept people from grandiose “boil the ocean” attempts.

What I hadn’t anticipated was the second-order benefits. Time and again the groups came up against problems that they solved in part by taking advantage of social infrastructure or context-sensitive information that wouldn’t be available to adherents of the Web School. Two strategies in particular stand out.

The first had to do with reputation systems. One project, The Orderer (designed by Vena Chitturi, Fa-yi Chou, Rachel Fishman, and Cindy Yang) was for coordinating group restaurant orders, common in late-night work sessions. The other, WeBe (Brandon Brown, Yoonjung Kim, Olivier Massot, Megan Phalines) was a tool for coordinating group purchases of things like chips or motors. Because money was involved, a Web School approach would require some way of dealing with the threat of non-payment, using things like pre-pay or escrow accounts, or formal reputation systems.

Instead, in both projects the students decided that since all the users were part of the ITP community, they would simply make it easy to track the deadbeats, with the threat of public broadcast of their names. The possibility of being shamed in front of the community became part of the application design, even though the community and the putative shame were outside the framework of the application itself.

Communal Attention

The other strategy had to do with communal attention. Two other projects, Scout (Karen Bonna, Christine Brumback, Dennis Crowley, Alex Rainert) and CoDeck (Mark Argo, Dan Melinger, Shawn Van Every, Ahmi Wolf) ended up being situated in the community in a more literal fashion. Scout indicates physical presence, by allowing students to register themselves as being present somewhere on the ITP floor, and displaying that information. CoDeck is a community-based video server, designed to allow video artists to share and comment on each other’s work. 

Both groups had the classic problem of notification — getting a user to tune in requires interrupting their current activity, not something users have been known to relish. Billions were spent on Web School applications that assumed users would bookmark for a return visit, or would happily accept email alerts, but despite a few well-publicized successes like Schwab.com and eBay, users have mostly refused to “check back often.” 

Both Scout and CoDeck hit on the same solution: take most of the interface off the PC’s dislocated screen, and move it into a physical object in the lounge, the meeting place/dining room/foosball emporium in the center of the ITP floor. Scout and CoDeck each built kiosks in the lounge with physical interfaces in lieu of keyboard/mouse interaction. Scout used a bar code reader to swipe in; CoDeck gutted a mid-70’s BetaMax chassis and put a Linux machine inside, then used the BetaMax buttons to let the user control the video stream. Both Scout and CoDeck have web sites where users can enter or retrieve data, but the core piece of each is location in physical space that puts the application in a social context.

These projects all took the course’s original dictum — the application must be useful to the community — and began to work with its corollary as well — the community must be useful to the application.

Group Capabilities

We constantly rely on the cognitive capabilities of individuals in software design — we assume a user can associate the mouse with the cursor, or that icons will be informative. We rarely rely on the cognitive capabilities of groups, however, though we rely on those capabilities in the real world all the time.

In brainstorming sessions, a group can generate not just more ideas but more kinds of ideas than the same individuals working in isolation, and a group consensus is often more accurate than the guess of the group’s most knowledgeable individual. Groups also know a lot about themselves. People in work groups know who to go to for design advice, or who is unreliable in a pinch, without any formal designation of those roles. Members of social groups know who it’s fun to go drinking with or who you shouldn’t lend money to (often the same person) without needing that knowledge to be spelled out in a FAQ.

Web School software ignores this kind of knowledge, because it is hard to make explicit. On most large mailing lists, for example, only a handful of posters start discussions, while most posters simply follow-up; and, at a higher level, only a handful of the members post at all, while a most simply lurk. We’ve known about these patterns for decades, but mailing list software still does not offer any features specific to starting vs. continuing threads, nor does it treat high-volume posters and lurkers differently. 

There is another strategy, however, analogous to asking the user to recognizing icons; the designer can simply assume the group has a certain capability, without needing to recapitulate it in code. If you have an uncollected payment in a communal buying pool, the software can kick out a message that says “Deadbeat alert. Deal with it.” A real world group will have some way of handling the problem, usually through moral suasion or the threat of lost reputational capital, or even, in extreme cases, ostracism.

This is no different than what happens in offline groups every day, but the solution feels wrong, in Web School terms, because those web applications can’t assume there is a tacit reputation system. By relying on existing social fabric, situated software is guaranteed not to work at the scale Web School apps do, but for the same reason, it can work in ways Web School software can’t.

Outside Eyes

I finally started regarding situated software as a practical development strategy, rather than as a degenerate case of “real” application development, when I invited outside reviewers into the Social Software class for a mid-term critique. These were all people who work with social software for a living, and the critique session was enormously valuable. Two of the recommendations made by the reviewers, however, struck me funny.

The first was the suggestion, made to the CoDeck group, that they should make all the features of their video tool available over the web — upload, download, comment, and so on. The second recommendation was an exhortation to the WeBe group that they should look at Web School group-buying sites like Mercata and MobShop as guides to their own work.

This was the moment for me when cognitive dissonance finally became unsupportable. Each of those comments was a) exactly what I would have said, had I been an outside reviewer in someone else’s class, and b) obviously wrong, given the problem the respective groups were attacking.

The suggestion about general web accessibility for the CoDeck interface came in the form of a rhetorical question — “Why not make it as broadly accessible as possible?” In the Web School, of course, the answer is “No reason”, since more users are always A Good Thing, but for CoDeck there were several good reasons for not simply turning their project into a Web video app. 

First, the physicalization of the interface, using the gutted BetaMax deck, provides a communal affordance that it is impossible to replicate over the web. Second, since CoDeck serves a tight community, the density of communication among ITP video makers would be diluted by general accessibility. Third, having the video deck in the lounge makes it self-policing; the cohesion of the community keeps it largely free from abuse, whereas a generally accessible and password-free “upload and critique” video site would become a cesspool of porn within hours. Finally, serving a local community maximizes use of free bandwidth on the local network, enabling features that would saddle a public system with crippling costs.

WeBe Small 

Similarly, the recommendation that WeBe should look at Mercata and MobShop carried with it the assumption that the goal should eventually be to operate at large scale. However, Mercata and MobShop failed because they were built to scale. 

Those sites required a virtuous circle, where more users meant more savings meant more users. Alas, the thought that somewhere, someone else was saving a bundle on Tupperware was never enough to attract users, and without critical mass, the virtuous circle turned vicious. Like RateMyProfessors.com, the mere existence of a Web School app wasn’t enough, and having been built for tens of thousands of users, it couldn’t operate for dozens or even hundreds.

WeBe, on the other hand, was copying a small-scale pattern they first observed when a fellow student, Scott Fitzgerald, orchestrated a 30-license discount purchase of Max, the multi-media editing software. He used the ITP mailing list to recruit buyers, and then walked around the floor twisting arms and collecting checks. This required real social fabric to work — everyone knew and trusted Scott. 

As the instigator, Scott also benefited from the good karma — everyone who participated saved quite a bit of money, enhancing his reputation. Unlike actual capital, reputational capital is easier to accumulate in smaller and more closed social systems. The idea for WeBe came about in part because Scott said the purchase, though successful, had required too much work. Whatever the WeBe group could do to make ITP group purchases easier, they didn’t need to build identity or reputation systems. Because the software was situated in a particular (and particularly tight) community, they got those things for free.

Old Scarcities Fade Away

Where the Web School works well, it works because it is the right kind of response to some sort of scarcity. There’s scarcity of funds: Servers are expensive, not to mention load-balancing routers, tape backups, and the other accouterments of serious uptime. There’s scarcity of talent: Good programmers are hard to find; great programmers are scarce as hen’s teeth. And there’s scarcity of use: Users are busy, they are creatures of habit, and there is significant competition for their attention. 

However, addressing these scarcities can give Web School design a kind of merry-go-round quality. You need to scale because building a useful web application is so expensive, but much of the expense comes from the requirements of scale. Furthermore, these scarcities amplify one another: You need a big hardware budget to build an application that can scale, but you need good programmers and system administrators to handle the load, whose salaries require an increased marketing budget, to attract enough users to pay for it all. 

What I think I’m seeing my students do is get off that ride. They can do this because none of the scarcities the Web School addresses are as significant as they used to be. First of all, Moore’s Law and its equivalent for storage, plus the gradual improvement in operating systems, means that an $800 desktop machine can also be a pretty good server right out of the box.

Second, user attention was scarce in part because there were so few users at all. In the 90’s, launching an application on the Web meant forgoing any direct connection with a particular real world community, because internet users were spread thin, and outside the IT industry, most real world groups had only a sub-set of members who were online. 

Those days are ending, and in some places they are over already. In the US today, if you are under 35 or make over 35,000 dollars a year, you are probably online, and if both of those things are true, then most of the people you know are probably online as well. You can now launch an application for a real world group, confident that all of them will have access to the internet.

The Nature of Programming, and the Curious Case of MySQL

Finally, the practice of programming is changing. Gartner recently caused a stir by saying there would be 235,000 fewer programmers in the US ten years from now. This would have been like predicting in the 80s, that there would be fewer typists in the US by 2004. Such a prediction would be true in one sense — the office typing pool has disappeared, and much data entry work has moved overseas. But actual typing, fingers hitting the keyboard, has not disappeared, it has spread everywhere. 

So with programming; though all the attention is going to outsourcing, there’s also a lot of downsourcing going on, the movement of programming from a job description to a more widely practiced skill. If by programmer we mean “people who write code” instead of “people who are paid to write code”, the number of programmers is going to go up, way up, by 2015, even though many of the people using perl and JavaScript and Flash don’t think of themselves as programmers. 

A variety of technologies are driving this — perl, PHP, ActionScript, DHTML — with a lot of mixing and matching and no one core tool, with one curious exception. Every application of this pattern I’ve seen has used a MySQL database.

There’s an analogy here with web server software. In the mid-90s, getting a web server running was such a messy endeavor that it was a project goal in and of itself. Then Apache came along, and so simplified the process that the web server became a simple building block for larger things.

MySQL does this for databases. This matters for the development of group applications, because the ability to sort is a public good. If Teachers on the Run had simply been a list of professors with attached comments, it would have been a write-only application, like those worthless “Tell us what you think!” comment forms on the bottom of news articles. One of the critical things any group wants to know is “What does everyone else think?”, especially if there is reason to believe that the group in aggregate knows more than any individual. Adding the ‘users rate comments’ system, and then pulling the data out by rating instead of time, made the system valuable. 

You can of course build these kind of features in other ways, but MySQL makes the job much easier, so much easier in fact that after MySQL, it becomes a different kind of job. There are complicated technical arguments for and against using MySQL vs. other databases, but none of those arguments matter anymore. For whatever reason, MySQL seems to be a core tool for this particular crop of new applications.

Software for Your Mom

Situated software isn’t a technological strategy so much as an attitude about closeness of fit between software and its group of users, and a refusal to embrace scale, generality or completeness as unqualified virtues. Seen in this light, the obsession with personalization of Web School software is an apology for the obvious truth — most web applications are impersonal by design, as they are built for a generic user. Allowing the user to customize the interface of a Web site might make it more useful, but it doesn’t make it any more personal than the ATM putting your name on the screen while it spits out your money. 

Situated software, by contrast, doesn’t need to be personalized — it is personal from its inception. Teachers on the Run worked this way. Everyone knew that Paul and Keren built it. You could only rate Clay and Marianne and Tom and the other ITP professors. You didn’t even know it even existed unless you were on the ITP mailing list. The application’s lack of generality or completeness, in other words, communicated something — “We built this for you” — that the impersonal facade of RateMyProfessors.com doesn’t have and can’t fake.

One of my students mentioned building a web application for his mother, a schoolteacher, to keep track of her class. If you were working alone, unpaid, and in your spare time, there’s no way you could make an application that would satisfy the general and complete needs of schoolteachers everywhere. You could make one for your mom, though. 

Small, purpose-built apps have always existed, of course — learning BASIC used to be a rite of passage for PC owners, and data intensive institutions like investment banks and research labs write software for small groups of users. Now, though, the combination of good tools, talented users and the internet as a social stage makes the construction of such software simpler, the quality of the result better, and the delivery to the users as simple as clicking a link. The design center of a dozen users, so hard to serve in the past, may become normal practice.

What Next?

So what happens next? If what I’m seeing is not transitory or limited to a narrow set of situations, then we’ll see a rise in these small form-fit applications. This will carry some obvious downsides, including tying the developers of such applications to community support roles, and shortening the useful lifespan of the software made in this way.

Expectations of longevity, though, are the temporal version of scale — we assume applications should work for long periods in part because it costs so much to create them. Once it’s cheap and easy to throw together an application, though, that rationale weakens. Businesses routinely ask teams of well-paid people to put hundreds of hours of work creating a single PowerPoint deck that will be looked at in a single meeting. The idea that software should be built for many users, or last for many years, are cultural assumptions not required by the software itself. 

Indeed, as a matter of effect, most software built for large numbers of users or designed to last indefinitely fails at both goals anyway. Situated software is a way of saying “Most software gets only a few users for a short period; why not take advantage of designing with that in mind?”

This, strangely, is a kind of progress, not because situated software will replace other kinds of applications, but because it mostly won’t. For all the value we get out of the current software ecosystem, it doesn’t include getting an application built for a handful of users to use for a few months. Now, though, I think we’re starting to see a new software niche, where communities get form-fit tools for very particular needs, tools that fail most previous test of design quality or success, but which nevertheless function well, because they are so well situated in the community that uses them.


Thanks to Shawn Van Every for invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this piece.